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ASSOCIATIONS AND CITIES AS (FORBIDDEN) PURE
PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
HEATHER ELLIOTT*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court interprets Article III’s case-or-controversy
language to require a plaintiff to show injury in fact, causation, and
redressability. A plaintiff who meets that tripartite test has standing
to sue and thus a personal stake in pursuing the litigation. Accord-
ingly, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court prohibited pure
private attorneys general: litigants who would sue without the
requisite personal stake. This limitation extends to organizations.
They, too, must show standing on their own account or, under Hunt
v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, identify a member
with Article III standing and show how the lawsuit is germane to the
organization’s purpose.
Yet when Hunt interacts with the complexities of modern standing
doctrine, it becomes clear that many associations, particularly those
that are large or have broad purposes, can show standing for vir-
tually any lawsuit. Moreover, recent scholarship has plausibly sug-
gested that municipalities can be treated as associations under Hunt;
municipal purposes are so broad, and some cities are so big, that they
could litigate almost any case they wish. But the purpose of the ban
on pure private attorneys general is to avoid giving any plaintiff a
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roving commission to enforce the law. Thus, Sierra Club and Hunt
are in serious tension.
This unnoticed conflict is further evidence of the notorious inco-
herence of Article III standing itself and might sensibly trigger a
rethinking of the entire doctrine. Such reform seems highly unlikely,
however, given nearly fifty years of standing’s reign. Alternatively,
Congress—which is far better placed than the courts to make nec-
essary factual determinations—could take steps to resolve the conflict
between Sierra Club and Hunt. But Congress has other priorities.
More modestly, the Court could make some changes at the margins
of Hunt and Sierra Club, to ameliorate the tension between the two
strands of standing doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, Article III of the United
States Constitution permits lawsuits to proceed in federal court only
if the plaintiff has standing to sue: the plaintiff must have suffered
an injury in fact fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant and
redressable at least in part by the court.1 Thus, if hypothetical
plaintiff Chris Lee is injured by pollutants emitted from a coal-fired
power plant, Lee would have standing to sue the plant for violations
of the federal Clean Air Act.2
Moreover, an environmental group in that same area could also
sue to enforce the Clean Air Act either by showing standing on its
own account or by relying on Lee’s standing.3 Hunt v. Washington
Apple Advertising Commission permits an organization to sue when
it has a member with standing and when the purpose of the suit is
germane to the group’s purpose.4
But if Lee is not injured by the plant’s emissions and sues merely
to punish the company for violating the law, the suit will be dis-
missed for lack of standing. In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme
Court rejected the idea of a pure “private attorney general”: a
litigant who, though having no concrete stake in the litigation,
would nonetheless be permitted to sue wrongdoers to ensure that
the law was obeyed.5
The term pure “private attorney general” contrasts the private
litigant with state or federal attorneys general, who are generally
1. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding injury from “cred-
ible threat to the plaintiff ’s physical well-being from airborne pollutants”).
3. See, e.g., St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 354
F. Supp. 2d 697, 700-02 (E.D. La. 2005) (finding that organization could sue because a
member suffered injury from “breath[ing] and smell[ing] polluted air”).
4. 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
5. 405 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1972). As discussed below, the Court has discussed “private
attorneys general” favorably in certain contexts. See infra Part I.B.3. But the Court means
only a litigant who sues both for herself and for the public; she may invoke the public interest
only after showing Article III standing. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private
Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2148-49 (2004). My concern
here is with the ban on “pure” private attorneys general: those who would litigate in the
public interest without the requisite personal stake. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an
Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 814-18 (2009).
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able to sue to enforce the law and protect the public interest.6 So, for
example, the United States can sue to enforce violations of the
Clean Air Act anywhere in the country,7 but a private party who
lacks Article III standing may not. Nor may associations litigate as
pure private attorneys general; if an organization lacks standing on
its own account or under Hunt, it fails the Article III test just as an
individual would.8 Such pure private attorneys general, the Court
has said, raise the specter of roving enforcers of the law who would
take the courts far beyond their Article III purview.9
But what about an organization with a sufficiently broad purpose
and a sufficiently large membership? Would not such an organi-
zation be able to satisfy Hunt in an almost infinite number of
situations? After all, a very large organization is likely to have,
somewhere in its membership, someone who has suffered the rele-
vant harm. If the organization also has an extremely broad purpose,
then, for virtually any topic, it could meet Hunt’s requirement that
the lawsuit be germane to its purpose. Such an organization would
seem to be able to bring any lawsuit it wanted, becoming a roving
enforcer of the law.
This is not simply a theoretical question. AARP, for example, has
thirty-eight million members and a very broad mission10 and has
been held to have standing under Hunt.11 And some scholars have
recently made plausible arguments that municipalities have asso-
ciational standing under Hunt.12 Such standing would be very broad
6. See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.11-.1 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing federal and state governments’ standing in federal
court).
7. See, e.g., United States v. LTV Steel Co., 187 F.R.D. 522, 523 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (ruling
on the United States’s action against a Pittsburgh company for violations of the Clean Air
Act).
8. 432 U.S. at 343. Hunt is inapplicable when individual participation is required for
the lawsuit to proceed (for example, when damages are at issue). Id. at 344.
9. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (“The federal courts have abjured appeals to their authority which
would convert the judicial process into ‘no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value
interests of concerned bystanders.’” (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687
(1973)).
10. AARP’s public statement of its mission is exceedingly broad: “to empower people to
choose how they live as they age.” About Our Policy, AARP, http://aarp.org/about-aarp/
policies [https://perma.cc/6XJA-MAPR]. 
11. AARP v. EEOC, 226 F. Supp. 3d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2016).
12. See infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
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for some cities: New York City, for example, has a population of
about 8.4 million and general home-rule powers, meaning it can act
to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens.13
Although there are presumably some limits on AARP and New York
City at the margins, their standing to sue under Hunt can be vast.
Moreover, even smaller organizations can take advantage of mod-
ern standing doctrine to act nearly as pure private attorneys gen-
eral. Organizations are free to recruit new members who have an
injury in fact, allowing them to tailor membership to satisfy Hunt.14
And courts have increasingly recognized injuries that affect large
segments of the population (injury from increased risk of future
harm, for example, or injury from procedural violations by regula-
tory agencies). So long as at least one of the many people suffering
a risk-based or procedural injury is a member, an organization can
predicate standing on that member.15 A small organization with a
broad enough purpose, then, could find Hunt standing fairly readily.
Hunt and modern standing doctrine thus interact to permit at
least some associations—and perhaps many municipalities—to act
as the forbidden pure private attorney general, a tension in the
doctrine that this Article is the first to reveal.16
How can this conflict be solved, if at all? First, the Court could
take this doctrinal conflict as further evidence of the bankruptcy
of standing doctrine. Almost since its inception, critics have high-
lighted the doctrine’s failings.17 Standing doctrine has become 
13. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2; QuickFacts: New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (July 1, 2018), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork [https://perma.
cc/2SLD-JWZ8]; infra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Katherine Mims Crocker, An Organizational Account of State Standing, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057, 2074 (2019) (arguing that a state’s “purpose” can satisfy Hunt).
17. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 426 (1974); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law
of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663 (1977). The criticisms
have continued without cease. See Hope M. Babcock, The Problem with Particularized Injury:
The Disjuncture Between Broad-Based Environmental Harm and Standing Jurisprudence, 25
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2009); Rachel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and Tangibility,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2285, 2286 (2018); William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory
Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 249 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified
Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677-78 (1990); Heather Elliott, Balancing
as Well as Separating Power: Congress’s Authority to Recognize New Legal Rights, 68 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 181, 182-83 (2015) [hereinafter Elliott, Balancing]; Heather Elliott,
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increasingly “incoherent,”18 “manipulable,”19 and “doctrinal[ly] con-
fus[ed]”20—what one scholar has called “a quagmire.”21 Accordingly,
lower courts produce conflicting results on similar facts.22 The pre-
viously unnoticed tension between the ban on pure private attorneys
general and the doctrine of associational standing further highlights
the incoherence and unpredictability of the doctrine. The Court
could abandon standing doctrine and, as many have urged before,
condition access to the federal courts on prudential and statutory
considerations. But standing doctrine has been entrenched for
nearly half a century, and the current Court seems unlikely to take
such a revolutionary step.
Second, Congress could amend jurisdictional statutes to solve the
conflict. Congress can consider systemic issues regarding access to
and burdens on the courts, confer causes of action on appropriate
plaintiffs, adjust associational standing to reflect concerns about
federalism and separation of powers, and the like.23 Of course, Con-
gress is unlikely to prioritize such changes.24
Modest juridical modification of Hunt and Sierra Club seems to
be the most likely solution. While courts are institutionally unsuited
Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 161 (2011) [hereinafter
Elliott, Inability]; Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 459
(2008) [hereinafter Elliott, Functions]; William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury
Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 305 (2002); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife:
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1198-200
(1993); Mark Seidenfeld & Allie Akre, Standing in the Wake of Statutes, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 745,
745 (2015); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845, 845-46 (2017);
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1023, 1023-24 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1458 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Privatization]; Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37, 38-40 [hereinafter Sunstein, Injuries].
18. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 221.
19. Sunstein, Privatization, supra note 17, at 1458.
20. Id.
21. Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1505
(2008).
22. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741
(1999).
23. As I discuss below, the First Amendment rights of speech, association, and petition
constrain but do not preclude Congress’s involvement in regulating Article III courts’ juris-
diction. See infra notes 341-45 and accompanying text.
24. See generally TOM DAVIS ET AL., THE PARTISAN DIVIDE: CONGRESS IN CRISIS (2014).
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to draw the kinds of lines Congress could draw,25 they could, for
example, make a formal distinction between membership associa-
tions and municipalities26 or add indicia of expertise to the Hunt
requirements.27
* * * 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I lays out the doctrinal
background. Part II shows that some associations and municipali-
ties are able to act as nearly pure private attorneys general, cre-
ating a genuine tension in the doctrine.28 Part III then turns to
potential solutions.
I. ARTICLE III STANDING
Article III assigns to the Judicial Branch the authority to resolve
“Cases” and “Controversies.”29 Thus, the courts have come to observe
both constitutional and prudential limitations on their jurisdiction
arising from ripeness,30 mootness,31 the rule against advisory
25. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
26. City of Olmstead Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 267-68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The City does
not have ‘members’ who have voluntarily associated, nor are the interests it seeks to assert
here germane to its purpose.” (emphasis omitted)).
27. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-55 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 755
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 755-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
28. I do not discuss whether Hunt applies or should apply to states, which can sue in
parens patriae, see infra note 246 and accompanying text, and are also given “special
solicitude” under Article III, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). A recent
symposium presented variety of perspectives on state standing. See Symposium, Federal
Court, Practice and Procedure: State Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1883 (2019).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under their Authority;
- to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party; - to Controversies between two or more States; - [by] a State [against] Citizens of
another State; - between Citizens of different States, - between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof;
- and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
30. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-34 (1998) (finding the
case not yet ripe because U.S. Forest Service logging and clear-cutting plan did not yet apply
to any specific tracts of land).
31. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 (1974) (holding that the case was
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opinions,32 and the political question doctrine.33 In the last forty
years, the Supreme Court has determined that “perhaps the most
important of these” restrictions is the requirement that the plaintiff
have standing to sue.34 These justiciability doctrines together
implement “the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers
of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of govern-
ment.”35 Pure private attorneys general—whether individuals or
associations—are said to take the courts far beyond those limits.
In the remainder of this Part, I give a short overview of standing
doctrine generally and of the separation-of-powers concerns raised
by the doctrine, then turn to the prohibition on private attorneys
general and the specifics of associational standing.
A. Standing Basics
Although the elements of standing doctrine are relatively simple
to state, their application can be complex and controversial. After
laying out the doctrine, I describe some of the expansive criticisms
of the doctrine.
1. Basic Doctrine
Current standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to meet a tripar-
tite test of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.36 The test
emerged in its current tripartite form in 1978,37 the result of
tightening criteria for Article III standing throughout the 1970s.38
mooted by the plaintiff student’s enrollment in his final semester of law school).
32. See Letter from John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Associate Justices
to George Washington, President of the United States (Aug. 8, 1793), in RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 79 (5th ed.
2003).
33. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (recognizing six situations in which
cases are nonjusticiable for raising a political question, including cases in which there is “a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it”).
34. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
35. Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring);
accord Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. 
36. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
37. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978).
38. See Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine?
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Under the modern test, a plaintiff must first show “injury in fact”;
her injury must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or im-
minent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”39 Economic injuries satisfy
this prong of the test,40 as do harms to property.41 Noneconomic
harms, such as aesthetic and recreational injuries, can also satisfy
the injury prong.42 But the Court has rejected claims of injury that
it has found too abstract43 or too remote.44 The Court also rejects
what it calls “generalized grievance[s],” where the plaintiff com-
plains about something that “is ‘undifferentiated and common to
all members of the public.’”45
An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 595-96
(2010); Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1134-35
(2009); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 230 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1372-74 (1988). As recently as 1962,
the Court framed standing using much less constraining language: “the gist of the question
of standing” is whether “the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
Baker, 369 U.S. at 204; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 758 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (describing “the customary criteria” of standing as “the existence of a genuine
dispute; the assurance of adversariness; and a conviction that the party whose standing is
challenged will adequately represent the interests he asserts”).
39. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (“For standing
purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an ‘injury.’” (citation omitted));
Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Monetary harm is
a classic form of injury-in-fact.”).
41. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (holding that the loss of
coastline to sea-level rise amounted to “particularized injury in [Massachusetts’s] capacity as
a landowner”).
42. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738 (“[T]he interest alleged to have been injured
‘may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational as well as economic values.’” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970))).
43. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1974)
(“[E]very provision of the Constitution was meant to serve the interests of all. Such a
generalized interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a ‘case or controversy’ appropriate
for judicial resolution.”). 
44. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110 (1983) (holding that plaintiff had no
standing to seek an injunction against Los Angeles Police Department practice of using
strangleholds, even though he had been subjected to the practice in the past, because he could
not show a sufficient likelihood of being subjected to the practice in the future).
45. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 35 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 428 U.S. 166, 177 (1974)).
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Second, the injury must be “fairly traceable” to the actions of the
defendant; although the plaintiff need not show that the defendant
is the sole cause of the injury she has suffered, she must show the
defendant is at least partially responsible.46 So, for example, in
Warth v. Seldin, the plaintiffs who sued to challenge a city’s ex-
clusionary zoning law lacked standing because they could not show
that the law, rather than independent decisions by developers,
caused the lack of affordable housing.47
Third, the plaintiff must show that a favorable decision will re-
dress her injury, at least in part. Thus Warth can be construed also
as a failure to redress: invalidating the statute would not remedy
the plaintiffs’ injuries.48 As Warth makes clear, causation and
redress can be opposite sides of the same coin. Remedy is, however,
a separate requirement.49 Even if a plaintiff shows that she has
suffered an injury caused by the defendant, she will lack standing
if the court is unable to order any suitable relief.50
The determination of standing is apparently simple but exceed-
ingly complex at the margins. As the Court has recognized, the “doc-
trine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise
definition.”51 Moreover, it is easy to confuse the standing question
with other questions, such as whether a plaintiff has stated a cause
46. See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517, 524-25 (rejecting the EPA’s argument that
causation was lacking in challenge to EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases; even if other
causes contributed to global climate change, EPA’s inaction still made “a meaningful
contribution” and thus supported standing).
47. 422 U.S. 490, 506 (1975) (“[P]etitioners’ descriptions of their individual financial
situations and housing needs suggest ... that their inability to reside in Penfield is the
consequence of the economics of the area housing market, rather than of respondents’
assertedly illegal acts.”). This, of course, is a grudging description of causation: while striking
down the exclusionary zoning law might not be sufficient to cause affordable housing to be
built, it is certainly a necessary condition. See id. The Court has more generally given little
guidance on what the causation analysis should entail. 
48. Id. at 507 (“[Plaintiffs] rely on little more than the remote possibility, unsubstantiated
by allegations of fact, that their situation ... might improve were the court to afford relief.”).
49. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 105, 107 (1998) (declining to decide whether plaintiff had suffered
injury in fact because plaintiff would, in any case, fail the redressability prong of the standing
test).
50. E.g., Steele Co., 523 U.S. at 105-06 (holding that organization failed to satisfy Article
III standing test because harms allegedly caused by the defendant could not be remedied by
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, payment of litigation costs, or civil penalties payable to
the United States Treasury).
51. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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of action. Standing is a threshold inquiry into jurisdiction and is im-
portantly distinct from the merits question of whether the plaintiff
states a claim, and yet the distinction can be difficult to make.52
The Court also continues to expand the requirements of stand-
ing. It is now clear, for example, that standing must be shown for
each claim a plaintiff seeks to bring.53 Similarly, although plaintiffs
were originally required only to identify their concrete injuries
(leaving the issue of remedy to the court’s discretion),54 the Supreme
Court later determined that standing must be shown for each type
of relief sought.55 Relatedly, the Court previously suggested that,
once one plaintiff had standing, the participation of other parties
was permissible even if their Article III standing was not clear.56 In
other words, once one party had proven that a case or controversy
existed, others could join the case regardless of their standing.57 But
the Court has now clarified that this is true only if the relief sought
by all parties is identical; if one party seeks even slightly different
relief, then that person must show standing on her own, regardless
of the standing of other parties.58
52. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89, 97 n.2. See generally Fletcher, supra note 17.
53. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (“[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross.” (quo-
ting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996)). This view is not inevitable, however. See
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 266 n.30 (1963) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (“[T]he complaint in every case thus far challenging an establishment [of religion] has
set forth at least a colorable claim of infringement of free exercise. When the complaint
includes both claims, and neither is frivolous, it would surely be overtechnical to say that a
parent who does not detail the monetary cost of the [Establishment Clause violation] to him
may ask the court to pass only upon the free-exercise claim, however logically the two may
be related.”).
54. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (“[W]here legal rights have been invaded [and
a cause of action is available, a] federal court[ ] may use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done.”).
55. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (holding that the
plaintiff ’s standing to seek damages did not transfer to standing to seek an injunction).
56. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (“It is clear ... that the Federal Election
Commission ... has standing, and therefore we need not address the standing of the inter-
venor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC’s.”), overruled on other grounds
by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
57. See id.
58. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017) (“[A]n intervenor
of right must demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief beyond that
which the plaintiff requests.”).
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2. Basic Criticisms
The complexity and continued expansion of the doctrine mean
that results in the lower courts and in the Supreme Court itself are
unpredictable.59 Critics have accordingly called the doctrine “a mo-
rass,”60 “incoherent,”61 “manipulable,”62 permeated with “doctrinal
confusion,”63 and without historical basis.64 They have also argued
that the doctrine permits merits decisions hidden as jurisdictional
decisions65 and imposes a “pointless constraint on courts.”66 Indeed,
dissenting members of the Court have accused majorities of using
standing as “a cover” for improper analyses67 and described the
extremes of standing analysis as “a word game played by secret
rules.”68 The Court itself even stated that “[s]tanding has been
called one of ‘the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of
public law,’”69 in part because the words “cases and controversies ...
have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity
submerged complexities.”70
Commentators even accused courts of engaging in substantive
due process through standing analysis,71 contending that the doc-
trine permits courts to make important decisions about consti-
tutional balance and separation of powers while pretending that
59. See generally Pierce, supra note 22.
60. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 677.
61. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 221.
62. Sunstein, Privatization, supra note 17, at 1458.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 38, at 1418-25 .
65. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 17, at 663.
66. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 75 (2007) (discussing
standing and other justiciability doctrines).
67. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 99 (majority opinion) (second alteration in original) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 498
(1966) (statement of Professor Paul A. Freund)).
70. Id. at 94 (internal quotations omitted).
71. See, e.g., Sunstein, Privatization, supra note 17, at 1480 (arguing that a strict view of
standing produces results much like that of the Lochner era, “when constitutional provisions
were similarly interpreted so as to frustrate regulatory initiatives in deference to private-law
understandings of the legal system”); see also Fletcher, supra note 17, at 233 (“[O]ne may even
say that the ‘injury in fact’ test is a form of substantive due process.”); Sunstein, supra note
38, at 167 (“[T]he injury-in-fact requirement should be counted as a prominent contemporary
version of early twentieth-century substantive due process.”).
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they are actually making technical decisions at the threshold.72
Those decisions may constrain judicial power in ways inconsistent
with the constitutional plan.73 Many critics have argued that recent
standing doctrine has improperly “reduc[ed] the permissible role of
Congress in government policymaking.”74 Congress should be able
to write statutes in which Congress decides on proper remedies and
enforcement actions.75 The courts, by deciding when suits may go
forward, interfere with that power.
Indeed, the barriers to congressional action in this arena are now
formidable. Although in Warth the Court said that standing could
be satisfied by “‘statutes creating legal rights,”76 thus allowing
Congress to confer standing on new plaintiffs, the Court later held
that Article III prevents Congress from conferring standing on
anyone who would not meet the Court’s requirements.77 Thus, as the
Court held in Lujan, Congress may create legal causes of action for
those who suffer injuries in fact.78 But it may not ignore Article III
standing limitations.79 The Court has emphasized this as recently
72. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 17, at 305 (contending that the injury-in-fact standard
“should neither be used to restrict the powers of Congress to authorize jurisdiction, nor to
force Article III authority into channels marked principally by the Justices’ own unexamined
and unexplained preferences”); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 68, 101 (1984) (noting that, in addition to separation-of-powers issues, standing cases
have implicated federalism and localism issues).
73. E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 690 (“[T]here is no basis for the implicit
assumption ... that less judicial review necessarily enhances separation of powers.”).
74. Pierce, supra note 17, at 1170; see Nichol, supra note 17, at 305; Smith, supra note 17,
at 878 (“[C]onstitutionalizing prudential limits sometimes significantly harms congressional
efforts to expand access to federal courts, especially Congress’s ability to create and enforce
rights.”); see also David Krinsky, How to Sue Without Standing: The Constitutionality of
Citizen Suits in Non-Article III Tribunals, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 301, 308 (2007).
75. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 1201.
76. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (emphasis added) (quoting Linda R. S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)).
77. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). As I have argued,
leaving the question of who may sue entirely in Congress’s hands is at least somewhat
problematic, because Congress has the incentive to “shunt[ ] a tricky question into the court”
in ways that might disturb the balance of power among the branches. Elliott, Functions, supra
note 17, at 499. But the standing doctrine goes much further than required to protect against
this danger. See id. at 499-501.
78. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (“Congress[ ] [can] elevat[e] to the
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate
in law.” (emphasis added)).
79. Id. at 576 (“Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement[,] ... they would be discarding a
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as 2016.80 Even if Congress purports to authorize “any person” to
sue to enforce the law, the Court has said that such language mere-
ly reflects Congress’s intent to permit suits only as broadly as
Article III authorizes.81
B. Private Attorneys General
Standing doctrine prohibits the “pure” private attorney general:
a plaintiff who would sue solely in the public’s interest, without
having a concrete stake in the case. In this Subpart, I discuss the
idea of the pure private attorney general, the Court’s rejection of it,
and the remaining concept of the impure private attorney general.
1. The Idea of the Pure Private Attorney General
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Court toyed with the
idea of a broad view of Article III, which would have allowed pure
private attorneys general. Professor William Rubenstein tracks
the origin of the idea to several mid-twentieth-century cases that
mentioned either a private attorney general or a “King’s proctor”;
citizens would be able to sue to protect the public, just as the At-
torney General can.82 The idea was also supported by academics:
principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch.”
(emphasis added)); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547-48 (2016); Grove,
supra note 5, at 782 (“[A]lthough Congress may, consistent with Article III, authorize the
Executive Branch to assert the abstract ‘injury to the interest in seeing the law obeyed,’
Congress may not confer similarly broad standing on private parties.” (quoting FEC v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)). See generally Elliott, Inability, supra note 17.
80. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547-48 (“It is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s
standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue a plaintiff who would not
otherwise have standing.” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)).
81. E.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-66 (1997).
82. See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 2133-35 (“[T]he private attorney general[ ] made its
first appearance in the legal literature in a 1943 decision by Judge Jerome Frank for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.... In the decision’s key passage, Judge Frank con-
cluded that Congress could authorize a private citizen to file suit even if the sole purpose of
the case were to vindicate the public interest as opposed to some private interest of the lit-
igant: ‘Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.’ And thus the
concept was hatched—sort of. The practice of private lawyers supplementing the enforcement
of public laws was hardly novel .... Two years prior to Judge Frank’s decision for the Second
Circuit, Judge Edgerton, of the D.C. Circuit, commenting on a similar type of litigant, stated,
‘[H]e appears only as a kind of King’s proctor, to vindicate the public interest.’” (alteration in
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Professor Louis Jaffe, for example, argued that it was essentially
irrelevant for Article III jurisdiction that a plaintiff pursued any-
thing on his own account.83 Whatever limits there might be on ju-
dicial power, he argued, those limits were not sensibly connected to
“the character of the plaintiff and his claim for justice.”84
In other words, in Professor Jaffe’s view, the “plaintiff’s [personal
stake in the case] (or lack of it) has no bearing on these questions.”85
Instead, something besides the plaintiff’s stake would determine
whether a case or controversy existed, including the desirability
of citizen participation in government through litigation and the
need for judicial intervention to protect individual rights in “cases
where discrimination or repression is latent [and thus] where no
particular individual is as yet a demonstrable object of such un-
constitutional action.”86
A few Justices would have adopted Professor Jaffe’s approach.
The second Justice Harlan would have held that pure private at-
torneys general “are not constitutionally excluded from the feder-
al courts.”87 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Douglas, suggested something less broad: associations should be
able to sue in the public interest.88
Such a broad authorization was not without its problems for these
Justices, but those problems were not of a constitutional nature.
Instead, “[t]he problem ultimately presented ... is ... to determine in
what circumstances, consonant with the character and proper
original) (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, Assoc. Indus. of New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943); Colorado Radio Corp. v. FCC, 118 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
(Edgerton, J., concurring); FCC v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. 239, 265 n.1 (1943) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting))).
83. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1968).
84. Id. at 1041.
85. Id. at 1046-47.
86. Id. at 1045-46.
87. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
88. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 757-58 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I
would permit an imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts of standing in order to
enable an organization such as the Sierra Club, possessed, as it is, of pertinent, bona fide, and
well-recognized attributes and purposes in the area of environment, to litigate environmental
issues.”); id. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I share the views of my Brother Blackmun.”);
id. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I agree that the Sierra Club has standing for the reasons
stated by my Brother Blackmun.”).
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functioning of the federal courts, such suits should be permitted.”89
Thus, in Justice Harlan’s view, cases involving pure private attor-
neys general could be constrained by relying on Congress to
authorize causes of action for such plaintiffs.90
2. The Ban on Pure Private Attorneys General
Despite these arguments, the Supreme Court made clear in 1972
that it would require the plaintiff in federal court to show a concrete
interest in the lawsuit, barring the pure private attorney general.
In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Sierra Club sued to stop the construc-
tion of a Disney ski resort in the Mineral King Valley of California.91
The Club sued because of its general interest in promoting environ-
mental values, and did not identify any members who had actually
visited the Valley, a failing the Court found fatal.92 The Court found
Sierra “Club’s longstanding concern with and expertise in” environ-
mental issues insufficient to give rise to standing under Article III;93
if concern and expertise were all it took, far too many plaintiffs
could invoke the authority of the federal courts.94
Instead, the Sierra Club had to show injury either to itself or its
members.95 The requisite injury could be harm to the members’
aesthetic or recreational values, but a showing of harm was man-
datory.96 Because the Sierra Club had not identified any injured
members, it could not proceed.97
Under the modern doctrine, then, a plaintiff—even if she seeks to
vindicate public interests—must satisfy the tripartite standing test
of injury in fact, causation, and redressability in order to have
access to federal courts. The Court has rooted this requirement in
89. Flast, 392 U.S. at 120 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 131.
91. 405 U.S. at 730.
92. Id. at 735.
93. Id. at 736.
94. Id. at 739-40 (“[I]f a ‘special interest’ in this subject were enough to entitle the Sierra
Club to commence this litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis upon which to
disallow a suit by any bona fide ‘special interest’ organization ... [or] any individual citizen
with the same bona fide special interest.”).
95. Id. at 734-35.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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the constitutional separation of powers. The judicial branch exists,
the Warth Court emphasized, “only to redress or otherwise to
protect against injury to the complaining party.”98 Otherwise, “the
courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide
public significance even though other governmental institutions
may be more competent to address the questions and even though
judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights.”99
The ban on pure private attorneys general partakes of the over-
arching separation-of-powers theory of standing doctrine, which
helps assure “the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts
in a democratic society.”100
Pure private attorneys general, the Court believes, take the
courts far beyond their constitutional purview, “conver[ting them]
into judicial versions of college debating forums.”101 As noted above,
98. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
99. Id. at 500.
100. Id. at 498; see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The law
of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”). The ban on
pure private attorneys general is not universally recognized as a requirement of a democratic
republic. California long permitted pure private attorneys general under California Business
and Professions Code section 17204, which authorized suit “by any person acting for the
interests of itself, its members or the general public” to enforce the provisions of California’s
Unfair Competition Law. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2003) (amended in 2004 to
require a showing of injury). California common law still permits plaintiffs to sue without
particularized injury if they seek a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of a public
duty. See, e.g., Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 1005, 1011
(Cal. 2011) (“[W]here the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the [petitioner] need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having
the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.” (quoting Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County
of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 98, 100-01 (1945) (second alteration in original)); see also
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1007-08, 1007 n.22
(2001) (identifying Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, and South Dakota
as states that have environmental statutes that can be enforced by citizens without a
threshold showing of personal injury). Moreover, Israel’s Supreme Court, when it sits as the
High Court of Justice, imposes no standing limitations. Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging:
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 106-10 (2002).
101. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982); see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 598
(2007).
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this is a constitutional restriction that Congress cannot alter by
statute.102
The rule is no different for associations, even though we might
think that associations are particularly good litigators in the public
interest.103 Indeed, we might in some circumstances think that orga-
nizations are the only likely litigators; in the environmental and
voting contexts, for example, harms may be so diffuse that no
individual will ever be motivated to sue, yet a lawsuit may provide
extensive societal benefit.104 Nevertheless, the Sierra Club or the
ACLU or the NAACP cannot bring suit simply because it believes
litigation is desirable for the larger public. As discussed in Part I.C,
the organization must either have standing on its own account or
under the associational standing doctrine of Hunt.
3. “Impure” Private Attorneys General
Notably, the Court does not reject the general idea of a private
attorney general, just the idea of a pure one.105 If a plaintiff survives
102. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event
... may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima.”); supra note 88 and accompanying text; see
also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); Elliott, Balancing, supra note 17, at
188-93 (arguing that Boerne stands in the way of congressional efforts to find standing by
statute). But see Seidenfeld & Akre, supra note 17, at 747-52 (arguing that Congress’s power
to find facts gives it more authority to define injury in fact and causation than has been
recognized).
103. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 891 (1983) (“[I]f the purpose of standing is
‘to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,’ the doctrine
is remarkably ill designed for its end. Often the very best adversaries are national orga-
nizations such as the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest
in the abstract question at issue in the case, but no ‘concrete injury in fact’ whatever.” (quo-
ting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1968))); see supra notes 82-83 and accompanying
text.
104. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495, 498-
99 (1986) (“[E]xposures to [certain pollutants] ... pose small risks to any single individual. Yet
the size of the exposed population or the lifetime exposure of single individuals makes
‘statistical deaths’ or ‘statistical carcinomas’ virtually certain.”).
105. See Rubenstein, supra note 5, at 2130-31; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private
Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 251 (1988); Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of
the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 194 (1998). Thus, class action
plaintiffs have been compared to private attorneys general because they vindicate their own
interests as well as those of others. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and
the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 167-70 (1997); Bryant Garth et al.,
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the standing test, he then may act as a “private attorney general”
and “argue the public interest in support of his claim.”106 Thus, the
Court may speak of parties’ “right to recover in their own interest
and as ‘private attorneys general.’”107 Indeed, there is no require-
ment even that the injury giving rise to standing be related to the
legal claim the plaintiff wants to raise, so long as the injury alleged
will be remedied by the relief sought.108
While Congress is forbidden to extend standing beyond the Court-
circumscribed limits of Article III, Congress is permitted to promote
citizen suits by the impure private attorney general and, accord-
ingly, has in many statutes authorized the recovery of attorneys’
fees.109 In Newman, the Court explains that such fees are necessary
to compensate the plaintiff for pursuing a suit that benefits both
the plaintiff and the public.110 The availability of such fees does not
confer standing, however.111
The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class
Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 353-57 (1988); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and
the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 90-93. But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Modeling Class Counsel, 81
NEB. L. REV. 1397, 1403-06 (2003) (arguing that while the private attorney general analogy
“has been an interesting idea and makes sense as a negative proposition, i.e., that class
counsel’s roles are not like that of ordinary counsel.... as an affirmative proposition, the
concept of private attorney general is not only unhelpful, it is also misleading”).
106. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972).
107. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 147 (1968) (Fortas, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
108. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 72-75 (1978)
(granting environmental plaintiffs standing, based on environmental and health injuries, to
challenge the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act’s limitation on financial liability for
nuclear plant accidents); see also, e.g., In re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1173
(10th Cir. 2004) (“But there is no requirement that the legal basis for the interest of a plaintiff
that is ‘injured in fact’ be the same as, or even related to, the legal basis for the plaintiff ’s
claim.”).
109. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968) (per curiam)
(interpreting attorneys’ fees provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204(b), Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2012))).
110. Id. (“If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunc-
tive powers of the federal courts.”).
111. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (“[A] plaintiff
cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing
suit.”).
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C. Associational Standing
The Court has long acknowledged that organizations may be
appropriate litigants.112 In NAACP v. Button, for example, the
NAACP had standing because the organization itself had been
harmed,113 what courts call “direct standing.”114 The NAACP could
also sue on behalf of any members who had also suffered injury,
permitting organizational standing that is derivative of the orga-
nization’s members’ interests.115
Associations are not simply appropriate litigants; they may also
be the best or only litigants in certain situations.116 As the Court
noted in Button, for groups that lack political power, “association
for litigation may be the most effective form of political asso-
ciation.”117 The Court has recognized that people often join an or-
ganization “to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests
that they share with others.”118 Indeed, because standing doctrine
more readily permits suits by regulated entities (companies or in-
dividuals whose activities will be limited by government regulation)
than by regulatory beneficiaries (those who will benefit from the
restrictions imposed by government regulation),119 even though
112. “Association” or “organization” are not narrowly defined; even Wright & Miller’s
discussion of associational standing seems to assume no definition is needed. 13A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 6, § 3531.9.5. Corporations, at least publicly traded ones, probably are not
“associations” of shareholders, see id., though as noted below corporations can be members
of associations, see infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. But see Charles H. Steen &
Michael B. Hopkins, Corporate Governance Meets the Constitution: A Case Study of Nonprofit
Membership Corporations and Their Associational Standing Under Article III, 17 REV. LITIG.
209, 218 (1998) (noting that, if a nonprofit is organized as a corporation, its members “stand
in the place of shareholders”). Legislatures should also not be considered “associations” in the
Hunt sense, though this may be because their members lack standing to sue in many of the
circumstances they might want to. Cf. Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct.
1945, 1950 (2019) (holding that one house of the Virginia legislature lacked standing on its
own account to represent interests of state).
113. 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
114. See, e.g., Meek v. Martinez, 724 F. Supp. 888, 901 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
115. Button, 371 U.S. at 428.
116. See supra notes 103-04 (discussing difficulty of individual suit in cases of broadly
diffused injury).
117. Button, 371 U.S. at 431.
118. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock,
477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986).
119. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992) (“[When] the plaintiff is
himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.... there is ordinarily little question
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there are collective-action barriers to suits by regulatory benefi-
ciaries.120 The rest of this Subpart explains both direct and mem-
ber-derived associational standing.
1. Direct Standing for Associations
Just as a human individual may sue if she shows injury in fact,
causation, and redressability, so too may an organization if it shows
the same on its own account.121 An organization may show standing
by demonstrating that it has lost or will lose funding or members
because of the actions of the defendant and that a favorable ruling
from the court will alleviate those losses.122 An organization may
also show injury and causation by alleging that the defendant’s
actions have required the organization to expend additional re-
sources and that a favorable ruling from the court will alleviate the
need to expend those resources.123 Some courts appear to have
approved a quite flexible approach to this second category, leading
to criticism.124
that [he has standing;] ... when, [however,] the plaintiff is not himself the object of the
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily
substantially more difficult to establish.”).
120. See Schroeder, supra note 104, at 535-36.
121. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (“[A]n [organization] may have
standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever
rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.”).
122. See, e.g., id.
123. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (finding that the
organization was forced to spend resources rooting out defendant’s allegedly discriminatory
housing practices, detracting from its affordable-housing counseling activities); Common
Cause/New York v. Brehm, 344 F. Supp. 3d 542, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding standing where
organization was forced to divert resources from registering new voters to helping reinstate
voters who had been purged from voting rolls).
124. See Ryan Baasch, Reorganizing Organizational Standing, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 18,
19-20 (2017) (allowing an organization to “identif[y] an activity that conflicts with its mission
and ... ma[ke] volitional counter-expenditures in response” causes a “self-inflicted injur[y]”
that does not suffice for Article III (third alteration in original)); see also Fair Hous. Council
v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1225-27 (9th Cir. 2012) (Ikuta, J., concurring and
dissenting) (criticizing perceived laxity in Ninth Circuit’s standards for direct organizational
standing). But see, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1430
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing union’s expenditures to combat the Line-Item Veto Act as
potentially “unnecessary alarmism constituting a self-inflicted injury”).
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2. Member-Derived Standing for Associations
As the Button case indicated, organizations may also satisfy
Article III standing requirements by relying on a member’s stand-
ing.125 Requiring associations to find members with the requisite
concrete connection to the lawsuit may be salutary for those or-
ganizations; rather than conducting their affairs in a rarefied at-
mosphere of experts and lawyers, the organization must find a
member on the ground who can satisfy the Article III require-
ments.126 Because the member need take no active role in the law-
suit, however, she may easily serve only as a figurehead rather
than as a meaningful participant.127
Though association standing has already been recognized in
earlier cases,128 the requirements for member-derived standing were
clarified in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commis-
sion, where the Court set out a three-pronged test for associational
standing: there must be (1) a member with Article III standing,
(2) whose presence is not necessary to the lawsuit, and (3) the
lawsuit must be germane to the organization’s purpose.129 The
remainder of this Subpart discusses these requirements.
a. Member with Standing
The basic requirements under the member-with-standing prong
arise from the standing doctrine described in Part I.A. But there are
some wrinkles related to the organizational nature of the plaintiff.
125. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
126. See Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Comment, Associational Standing for Organizations with
Internal Conflicts of Interest, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 356 (2002); Vivian Weston Lathers,
Comment, Associational Third-Party Standing and Federal Jurisdiction Under Hunt, 64 IOWA
L. REV. 121, 131 (1978).
127. Cf. Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives
in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 168 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Account-
ability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
370, 406 (2000).
128. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975); Nat’l Motor Freight Ass’n v. United States,
372 U.S. 246, 247 (1963).
129. 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
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Most importantly, the organization must have members,130
though it does not have to be a formal membership organization.131
The members can be human beings, of course, but they can also be
corporations132 or other associations.133 A would-be associational
plaintiff that is not actually organized as a membership associa-
tion, however, cannot invoke Hunt.134
The organization must then identify at least one member who
has been injured in the concrete and particularized way required by
the standing cases, whose injury is fairly traceable to the actions of
the defendant, and whose injury can be redressed, at least in part,
by the proposed remedy.135 The organization need not show that a
130. See, e.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. N.Y. Coal. for Quality Assisted Living, Inc., 675
F.3d 149, 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a private, nonprofit disability services
contractor could not invoke Hunt because the contractor was not a membership organization
in any sense). The D.C. Circuit rejected an attempt to claim everyone on an organization’s
mailing list as a member. See Gettman v. DEA, 290 F.3d 430, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
131. Fund Democracy, LLC v. SEC, 278 F.3d 21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that an
organization can use Hunt if it “is the functional equivalent of a traditional membership
organization”).
An organization is the functional equivalent of a traditional membership organization if
“(1) it ... serve[s] a specialized segment of the community; (2) it ... represent[s] individuals that
have all the ‘indicia of membership’ including (i) electing the entity's leadership, (ii) serving
in the entity, and (iii) financing the entity's activities; and (3) its fortunes [are] tied closely to
those of its constituency.” Wash. Legal Found. v. Leavitt, 477 F. Supp. 2d 202, 208 (D.D.C.
2007) (quoting Fund Democracy, 278 F.3d at 25).
There appears to be some dispute in the cases about whether an organization that is a
formal membership organization may nevertheless have to show that it “serve[s] a specialized
segment,” has leadership elected by the members, and has “fortunes ... tied closely to those
of its constituency.” Id.; see Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of
Harvard Coll., 261 F. Supp. 3d 99, 107 (D. Mass. 2017) (noting unsettled question). Compare
Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2009)
(“The inquiry into the indicia of membership ... is necessary only when an organization is not
a traditional membership organization.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Ctr. for
Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the organization
had already shown it was “a traditional membership organization with a defined mission that
serves a discrete, stable membership with a definable set of common interests” but then
inquiring into the internal functioning of the organization, including the role of membership
in controlling organization).
132. See, e.g., Nat’l Constructors Ass’n v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 498 F. Supp. 510,
515, 522 (D. Md. 1980).
133. See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1988). 
134. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 286-90 (3d Cir. 2014) (rejecting
organizational standing in part because “organizational documents state[d] that [the or-
ganization] [did] not have members”); see also AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14, 23 (D.D.C.
2017) (collecting cases).
135. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
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significant proportion of its membership is affected; one member
suffices.136 An organization with associations for members may rely
on the standing of “its members’ members,”137 and an organization
may even be able to sue to help nonmembers if its members would
have third-party standing to represent the interests of those
nonmembers.138
The Supreme Court has also indicated that the member must be
identified,139 and so organizations ordinarily file affidavits from
individuals who affirm that they are members of the organization
and testify to facts that they believe meet the standing test.140 The
organization will typically solicit its membership to find a member
with standing or will recruit someone with standing to become a
member of the organization.141 An association that fails to satisfy
the member-with-standing prong typically has named no member
136. Id. at 511 (“The association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are
suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action.”).
137. 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3531.9.5.
138. Id. Third-party standing can arise in a number of circumstances. See id. § 3531.9.4.
For example, a plaintiff who has suffered an injury in fact may seek to redress that injury by
invoking the rights of a third party who faces a “hindrance” in protecting her own rights and
to whom the plaintiff has a “close” relationship. E.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)
(permitting a white man convicted of murder to invoke the rights of black citizens excluded
for allegedly discriminatory reasons from the jury that convicted him).
139. See, e.g., Ala. Leg. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1268-70 (2015); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1972). The member’s actual name need not be given,
if there is good reason to withhold it. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
459-60 (1958). It may also be impossible to identify which member has been harmed, even if
it is certain that such a member exists; there is some debate in the caselaw over whether an
organization can proceed in reliance on that unnamed yet certain member. See infra notes
211-25 (discussing standing based on risk).
140. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
181-83 (2000).
141. See, e.g., Citizens Coal Council v. Matt Canestrale Contracting, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 3d
632, 641-42 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (finding standing where organization concededly recruited new
members to satisfy the Hunt doctrine); Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp.
2d 884, 889-90 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (focusing on the fact that the proffered members had joined
the organization by the time it filed the lawsuit), vacated on other grounds 658 F.3d 1162 (9th
Cir. 2011). But see Wash. Legal Found. v. Leavitt, 477 F. Supp. 2d 202, 208 (D.D.C. 2007)
(rejecting Washington Legal Foundation’s claim to be a membership organization by noting
that the claim was “weakened” because proffered members had been recruited after decision
to litigate had been taken). As discussed below, organizations can therefore create standing
where it was previously lacking by recruiting as members individuals who satisfy Article III.
See infra Part II.B.3.
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at all142 or has named members who themselves lack Article III
standing.143 This requirement is not demanding.144
b. Case Can Proceed Without Member
Even though the organization must proffer members with stand-
ing to satisfy Hunt, the actual participation of those individuals
must be unnecessary for the suit to continue.145 For example, in a
suit where individualized proof of damages is required, and where
such “damages run[ ] solely to [the association’s] members,”146 an
association may not be permitted to proceed as plaintiff; each mem-
ber seeking damages would need to appear as a party to prove his
or her entitlement to the remedy.147 Similarly, the presence of
individual members may be necessary—and associational standing
proper—when the nature of the claim requires individualized proof
of facts.148 Because this prong of Hunt is prudential,149 however,
Congress can authorize organizations to litigate without the direct
participation of the organizations’ members.150
Courts have also sometimes declined to allow cases to proceed
under Hunt when a conflict existed among members over the
litigation or between the members of the organization.151 But
142. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735, 739. 
143. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-64 (1992) (holding that
Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental organizations lacked standing because the
proffered members lacked standing); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 873 F.3d 946, 948, 950-51
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding that, of three members named, two lived in areas not subject to the
challenged regulations, and the third lived in an area where the regulations, even if ap-
plicable, could have no adverse effect). 
144. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4456 (“Such standing is apt to be justified by
showing a relatively slight impact on a small number of identified members.”).
145. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
146. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. 544, 546
(1996).
147. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1975) (explaining that the suit over
profits and losses of construction firms required the participation of each firm, so the
membership organization could not bring suit on behalf of the firms).
148. E.g., Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 2007)
(finding that the question of whether individuals had mental capacity to vote, yet had been
adjudged incompetent to vote, required participation of those individuals).
149. United Food, 517 U.S. at 555.
150. Id. at 558.
151. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-321 (1980) (rejecting a religious group’s
standing under Hunt to raise a free exercise challenge to the Hyde Amendment, which
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conflicts within the membership over litigation are often not fatal
to organizational standing.152
c. Organizational Purpose
Finally, the organization must show that the purpose of the
lawsuit is germane to the association’s mission.153 This prong of the
Hunt test recognizes that people often form organizations “to create
an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with
others.”154 If the lawsuit is germane to the organization’s purpose,
one can expect that the membership would—at least in principle—
support the lawsuit. So, for example, an association of apple growers
may sue on behalf of its members for apple-growing-related is-
sues,155 but presumably not over private school vouchers or abor-
tion or other non-apple-growing-related issues.
There are two issues: determining what the organization’s
mission is, and then deciding whether the lawsuit at issue is ger-
mane to that mission.
i. Organizational Mission
Some commentators have suggested that narrowness is inherent
in the concept of a public interest organization: “All social reform
organizations, whether nonprofit corporations or unincorporated
associations, are formed for a particular purpose, be it fair housing,
separation of church and state, or protection of the environment.”156
severely limits federal funding of abortion, because of the diversity of views on abortion within
the group and the necessarily individual nature of a free exercise claim).
152. E.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401,
1409 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e reject the suggestion that unanimity of membership be required
in organizations seeking standing.”); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d
277, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See generally Edmonds, supra note 126.
153. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 33, 343 (1977); see also, e.g.,
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).
154. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock,
477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986).
155. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343; see also United Food, 517 U.S. at 553 (discussing Brock, 477
U.S. at 281-86). 
156. William Burnham, Aspirational and Existential Interests of Social Reform Orga-
nizations: A New Role for the Ideological Plaintiff, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 153, 185 (1985)
(footnote omitted).
1356 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1329
Some courts assume the same. The District Court of Utah, for
example, stated that organizations have “singleness of purpose.”157
But courts appear more likely to treat an organization’s purpose
flexibly. The D.C. Circuit said that “the [Supreme] Court nowhere
has suggested that mention of a given purpose in an organization’s
organic papers is talismanic.”158 As another judge put it, an organi-
zation need not use “any ‘magic words’ in its charter.”159 And the
purpose need not be a narrow one. The Third Circuit has said, “[We
have found] no authority indicating that an association cannot sat-
isfy the ‘germaneness’ requirement unless its purpose is narrow or
specific.”160
Courts have rejected efforts by public interest law firms to invoke
Hunt to their own benefit.161 But it is not clear whether such firms
fail under Hunt because they are not membership organizations or
because their purposes are too amorphous.162 As Judge Wald wrote,
Hunt “prevent[s] associations from being merely law firms with
standing.”163
157. Mountain States Legal Found. ex rel. Ellis v. Dole, 655 F. Supp. 1424, 1426 (D. Utah
1987). But see Mussington v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 824 F. Supp. 427, 431 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (“[T]wo of the organizations have purposes too broad to confer standing in this case.”).
158. Humane Soc’y v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
159. Minn. Fed’n of Teachers v. Randall, 891 F.2d 1354, 1364 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Hosp. Council of W. Pa. v. City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1991); see also
Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. Olsen, No. 2:08-cv-00875DAK,
2009 WL 5175202, at *6 (D. Utah Dec. 18, 2009) (“Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ members
have no definable set of common interests because, in large part, its membership is too diverse
and its structure too amorphous. American Charities, however, is seeking to protect interests
that are central to their existence as a representative organization and are at least part of the
reason that its members became members of the organization.”); Forum for Acad. &
Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 294 (D.N.J. 2003) (“The
germaneness prong is satisfied because [the organization]’s mission is sufficiently broad to
encompass the interests championed in this suit.”).
161. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Leavitt, 477 F. Supp. 2d 202, 207-08 (2007).
162. See McKinney v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544, 1556-57 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see
also Wash. Legal Found., 477 F. Supp. 2d at 208, 212 (rejecting the Washington Legal
Foundation’s claim to represent Medicare Part D subscribers).
163. Humane Soc’y, 840 F.2d at 58. 
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ii. Germaneness
Most courts have held that the test for germaneness is not a de-
manding one because the members of the organization will limit the
organization’s reach: “If the ‘forces that cause individuals to band
together’ guarantee some degree of fair representation, they surely
guarantee as well that associational policymakers will not run
roughshod over the strongly held views of association members in
fashioning litigation goals.”164 The D.C. Circuit thus described the
germaneness requirement as “relatively loose,”165 the Ninth Circuit
called it “undemanding,”166 and the Second Circuit thought “it sig-
nificant that the Hunt Court used the word ‘germane,’ rather than
the phrase ‘at the core of,’ or ‘central to.’”167 Dissenting members of
the Supreme Court have criticized the majority for giving too little
teeth to this aspect of Hunt.168
Even a loose version of the germaneness test excludes organiza-
tions at the margin. The Ninth Circuit, for example, rejected organi-
zational standing for a cattle-ranching organization when it sought
to bring a lawsuit regarding environmental issues, noting that the
164. Id. at 56.
165. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see
also Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the
litigation must be “pertinent” to the organization’s purpose).
166. Presidio Golf Club v. Nat’l Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998).
167. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Buffalo & Vicinity v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d
138, 148 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Selby, 624 F. Supp. 267, 271 (D.D.C. 1985)
(“An association’s litigation interests must be truly unrelated to its organizational objectives
before a court will declare that those interests are not germane.”); Med. Ass’n of Ala. v.
Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 955, 965 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (stating that germaneness test requires
that “the injury to [an association’s] members has some reasonable connection with the
reasons the members joined the organization and with the objectives of the organization”);
Nat’l Constructors Ass’n v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 498 F. Supp. 510, 521 (D. Md. 1980)
(defining the germaneness standard as allowing suits by groups whose purposes are
“pertinent or relevant to” the claim at issue); Crocker, supra note 16, at 2081 (citing cases).
A district court interpreted a Tenth Circuit decision regarding germaneness to require
members to be injured “qua members” in order to proceed under Hunt. See Mountain States
Legal Found. ex rel. Ellis v. Dole, 655 F. Supp. 1424, 1428 (D. Utah 1987) (citing MSLF v.
Costle, 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980)). But the Tenth Circuit held that there was no injury in
fact at all. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 767 (10th Cir. 1980). 
168. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v.
Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 296-97 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s “formalistic”
treatment of the germaneness prong and encouraging a meaningful inquiry).
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organization’s purpose was related to “trade and marketing.”169 The
key, according to Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit, is to “prevent[ ]
litigious organizations from forcing the federal courts to resolve
numerous issues as to which the organizations themselves enjoy
little expertise and about which few of their members demonstrably
care.”170
But even a demanding germaneness requirement will provide
little limit on organizational standing if an organization can have a
broad purpose. And, as noted above, few courts seem inclined to
reject an organization’s asserted purpose based on how broad or
narrow it is.171
3. Issues with Associations as Representative Litigants
When an association litigates using member-derived standing, it
acts to some extent in a representative capacity, and questions have
been raised about the nature of that representation. Some argued,
for example, that Congress had laid out the requirements for rep-
resentative action by defining class actions in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.172 The Court rejected this argument, contrasting
the “ad hoc union” of a litigation class with an ongoing association
that can “draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and
capital.”173 Associations, the Court held, permit individuals “to
create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share
169. Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. USDA, 415
F.3d 1078, 1104 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Minn. Fed’n of Teachers v. Randall, 891 F.2d 1354,
1359 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting teachers’ union’s suit challenging tax expenditures as viola-
tive of Establishment Clause because the union’s “charter fail[ed] to mention any interest
in taxes”). 
170. Humane Soc’y v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Minn. Fed’n of
Teachers, 891 F.2d at 1361 (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he sole
purpose of the germaneness test is merely to prevent organizations from pursuing litigation
concerning subjects about which they have little expertise or concerning grounds other than
those which have brought their membership together.” (emphasis added)).
171. See supra Part I.C.2.c.i.
172. Brock, 477 U.S. at 288-89 (describing the defendant’s argument that plaintiff union
should be required to meet the class action requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23).
173. Id. at 289; see also Fisch, supra note 105, at 167-70; Garth et al., supra note 105, at
353-57; Hazard, supra note 105, at 1403-06; Redish, supra note 105, at 90-93.
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with others.”174 Organizations need only meet the requirements set
forth in Hunt; they need not show numerosity, commonality,
typicality, or adequacy of representation, as Rule 23 requires of a
class action litigant.175
As the Court went on to note in Brock, the decision to allow as-
sociations to sue as representational litigants without guarantees
of adequate representation does not raise due process issues should
an argument later arise to preclude an association’s member from
suing over the same issue.176 This issue appears to have received
little attention in the courts.177
II. PURE PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL UNDER HUNT
If all associations were relatively small and had relatively focused
purposes, the Hunt doctrine would be uncontroversial; who could
complain about the Sierra Club litigating to protect the Mineral
King Forest once the Club identified members who actually used the
forest? Indeed, some cases assume that organizations are relatively
focused. For example, an informal association can invoke Hunt if it
has sufficient indicia of the traditional membership organization,
which includes “serv[ing] a specialized segment of” individuals.178
174. Brock, 477 U.S. at 290 (“The only practical judicial policy when people pool their
capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and form that will identify collective
interests, often is to permit the association or corporation in a single case to vindicate the
interests of all.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
176. Brock, 477 U.S. at 290 (“Should an association be deficient in [representing its
members], a judgment won against it might not preclude subsequent claims by the asso-
ciation’s members without offending due process principles.”); see, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 758-59 (1989), superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 as held by Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); see also 13A WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 6, § 3531.9.5; 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 4456.
177. 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3531.9.5 (noting that “the law is poorly developed”
on this question). For one case that wrestles with the complexities raised for preclusion by
associational standing, see Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 382 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.
2004), withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 399 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2005).
In particular, see Judge Berzon’s dissent, id. at 1032, and her later panel opinion, 399 F.3d
1047, 1050.
178. Fund Democracy, LLC v. SEC, 278 F.3d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)
(quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977)).
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And one justification for associations as litigators is that they “have
specialized expertise and research resources.”179
But, as noted above, most courts have addressed standing under
Hunt in a way that permits quite broad purposes.180 Some orga-
nizations may therefore be able to use Hunt to litigate almost any
lawsuit. If so, Hunt permits associations—such as pure private at-
torneys general—to have a roving commission to enforce the law,
which Sierra Club is meant to prohibit.
In the remainder of this Part, I show how associational standing
doctrine interacts with modern developments in standing doctrine
to allow some groups to act as nearly pure private attorneys general.
In other words, I show how Hunt collides with Sierra Club.
A. Organizational Size and Breadth
Despite a few cases implying that some organizations can be too
big to fit into the Hunt framework,181 I can find no case where a
court rejected a membership organization under Hunt for being too
large. For example, courts have found that AARP has standing
under Hunt,182 and, if any organization were going to be rejected for
size, it would be AARP. AARP is by far the largest membership
organization in the United States, with a current membership of
almost thirty-eight million people.183 If AARP were a nation-state,
it would be in the top forty by population—larger than either
Australia or Canada.184
Moreover, although at least one court has described AARP’s
mission as “defined,”185 AARP’s own public statements of its mission
179. Brock, 477 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added) (quoting Dale Gronemeir, Comment, From
Net to Sword: Organizational Representatives Litigating Their Members’ Claims, 1974 U. ILL.
L.F. 663, 669).
180. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 611 F.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir. 1979).
182. E.g., AARP v. EEOC, 226 F. Supp. 3d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2016).
183. Id.
184. Countries in the World by Population (2019), WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldo
meters.info/world-population/population-by-country/ [https://perma.cc/A8EP-3Y44].
185. AARP, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 17 (“[AARP] has a defined mission: to enhance the quality
of life for individuals as they age; to further independence, dignity, and purpose for indi-
viduals as they age; and to improve the image of aging.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
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appear quite broad: a “mission to empower people to choose how
they live as they age,”186 which includes “help[ing] people turn their
goals and dreams into real possibilities, strengthen[ing] commu-
nities and fight[ing] for the issues that matter most to families[,]
such as healthcare, employment and income security, retirement
planning, affordable utilities and protection from financial abuse.”187
As noted above, organizations are not required to use “talismanic”188
or “‘magic words’ in [their] charters,”189 and AARP itself uses the
inclusive construction “such as” in listing possible areas of in-
terest.190
Thus, if AARP were to bring a lawsuit about climate change, it
certainly could make a plausible argument that climate change
threatens its members’ ability “to choose how they live as they
age.”191 Imagine, for example, a member of AARP who has pur-
chased a retirement home on a barrier island off the coast of South
Carolina, a home that is threatened by rising sea levels and in-
creased risk of hurricanes.192 That person could readily meet the
injury-in-fact requirement and—depending on the defendant and
the causation and redressability requirements—AARP could invoke
that member’s standing under Hunt.
What issue, then, is excluded by AARP’s stated mission? Given
that one must be at least fifty years old to join AARP,193 and that
the organization’s purpose is linked to aging, it might not be ger-
mane to AARP’s mission to bring a lawsuit that, for example, deals
with education policy. Yet grandparents frequently contribute to
186. AARP, supra note 10.
187. Press Release, AARP, New AARP Survey Assesses the Issues that Matter Most to
African-Americans 50+ (June 2, 2014), https://press.aarp.org/2014-06-02-New-AARP-Survey-
Assesses-the-Issues-that-Matter-Most-to-African-Americans-50 [https://perma.cc/W2XE-
PTQ8].
188. Humane Soc’y v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
189. Minn. Fed’n of Teachers v. Randall, 891 F.2d 1354, 1364 (8th Cir. 1989).
190. AARP, supra note 187.
191. AARP, supra note 10.
192. See ‘Geography of Risk’ Calculates Who Pays When a Storm Comes to Shore, NPR (Oct.
17, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/17/770812863/geography-of-risk-calculates-who-pays-
when-a-storm-comes-to-shore [https://perma.cc/RTJ4-NPAR] (“Americans have chosen to build
$3 trillion worth of property in some of the riskiest places on earth—the barrier islands and
coastal flood plains of the Atlantic and Gulf Coast.”).
193. Why Join AARP?, AARP, https://www.aarp.org/membership/ [https://perma.cc/L3J5-
D595].
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their grandchildren’s educations, and education helps one follow
particular life paths over others, which, in turn, affects how one
chooses to age.194 Indeed, some people over the age of fifty attend
college.195 Particularly in jurisdictions that treat the “germaneness”
requirement flexibly,196 AARP would presumably have great
flexibility in what lawsuits it could bring.
No other traditional nonprofit organization comes close to AARP’s
size,197 but political parties in the United States do. Some theorists
have argued for generally treating political parties as membership
organizations,198 and some courts have applied Hunt to political
parties.199 Depending on who counts as members, the Democratic
Party or Republican Party could have memberships in the tens of
millions. Although most of the cases involve state parties and can-
didates,200 and no court, as far as I can tell, has held that a party
194. See John F. Waslik, The Best Way to Help a Grandchild with College, N.Y. TIMES
(May 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/your-money/the-best-way-to-help-a-
grandchild-with-college.html [https://perma.cc/8NEH-Q4T3].
195. See Laurie Quinn, Going Back to College After 50: The New Normal?, FORBES (July 1,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2018/07/01/going-back-to-college-after-50-the-
new-normal/ [https://perma.cc/XP3L-B3L8].
196. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
197. According to at least one Internet listing of large associations, AARP is by far the
biggest membership association, followed by, using 2015 numbers from the American Society
of Association Executives, the National Rifle Association (NRA) with 4.5 million members and
the National Education Association (NEA) with 3.2 million members. AM. SOC’Y OF ASS’N
EXECS., THE POWER OF ASSOCIATIONS 11 (2015), https://www.thepowerofa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/03/powerofassociations-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN6C-QSRT]. The NRA’s
original purpose was “to promote and encourage rifle shooting on a scientific basis” and
describes itself today “as America’s foremost defender of Second Amendment rights ... and the
premier firearms education organization in the world.” A Brief History of the NRA, NAT’L
RIFLE ASS’N (internal quotations omitted), https://home.nra.org/about-the-nra [https://perma.
cc/F7AD-FVZN]. The NEA’s “mission is to advocate for education professionals and to unite
[their] members and the nation to fulfill the promise of public education to prepare every
student to succeed in a diverse and interdependent world.” NEA’s Vision, Mission, and Values,
NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/19583.htm [https://perma.cc/6NRZ-LMNJ].
198. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Parties as Membership Groups, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 813, 817-18 (2000).
199. Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 2006) (using Hunt, in
dicta, to find standing for a party based on the interests of a candidate); Smith v. Boyle, 959
F. Supp. 982, 986 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (finding Hunt standing for the Illinois Republican Party
based on its members).
200. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007);
Benkiser, 459 F.3d at 587; Boyle, 959 F. Supp. at 986. But see Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 97-99 (1973) (discussing Democratic National Commit-
tee challenge to a television network’s political advertising policies).
2020] ASSOCIATIONS AND CITIES 1363
can predicate standing on its voters,201 Hunt arguably permits the
Democratic and Republican Parties to proceed as associations with
standing based on their members.
First, should either party organize as a national-level member-
ship organization, the doctrine would presumably accept that party
as an association.202 As explained above, courts do not impose sig-
nificant limitations on the ways in which an association functions
so long as it is actually a membership organization.203 Any member
of the party in the country could then serve to satisfy the member-
with-standing prong. And, although both parties are currently state
based,204 an association can be made up of other associations.205
Given that courts have regularly held that state political parties
have standing under Hunt based on their members,206 the national
parties—assuming their state parties are members of the national
parties—would have Hunt standing as well.
Although most cases applying Hunt to the parties have involved
voting or candidate issues,207 the parties could conceivably invoke
their platforms as stating their organizational purposes and assert
extremely broad purposes under Hunt. Both parties’ platforms cover
the gamut of issues in American politics: the economy (including
trade, taxes, job creation, and wages), energy, criminal justice, en-
vironment, infrastructure, technology, the financial system, mar-
riage, abortion, religious liberty, gun policy, drug policy, voting,
201. See, e.g., Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 811 (S.D. Ind. 2006)
(holding that the Indiana Democratic Party could not invoke the interests of those who might
vote Democratic: “Neither ‘desiring’ to vote for a candidate nor actually voting for that candi-
date constitutes membership or the substantial equivalent of membership in a political
party”).
202. As of 2019, both parties appear primarily to be organized through state-level parties,
which themselves may be composed of county-level parties. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM.,
THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 1 (2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/doc
uments/2016-Republican-Rules-Reformatted2018_1533138132.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLA9-
DFJF]; Find Local GOP, ALA. REPUBLICAN PARTY, https://algop.org/our-party/find-local-gop
[https://perma.cc/HS37-7XCA]; Party Organization, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., https://web.
archive.org/web/20190326201502/https://democrats.org/about/party-organization/ [https://
perma.cc/NT3U-K46R]; Why Alabama Democrats?, ALA. DEMOCRATS,, https://www.aldem
ocrats.org/about [https://perma.cc/7D5A-SU3V].
203. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 202.
205. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 2006).
207. See supra notes 198-99.
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agriculture, homeownership, education, health insurance and
healthcare policy, retirement, immigration, civil rights, urban
policy, human rights, military policy (including veterans), and
foreign policy.208 Given these broad platforms, the parties, such as
AARP, might well be able to litigate any issue they choose, so long
as at least one identified member satisfied the Article III standing
test.
AARP and the major political parties are the only truly huge
membership organizations, but even a small organization can
satisfy Hunt if it can gain a member with standing. Courts have
rejected arguments that associations have illicitly “manufactured”
lawsuits by recruiting members with injury in fact.209 Thus,
although a large organization might have an easier time identifying
a member with standing, a small organization can grow in a way
that permits it to satisfy Hunt. If such an organization has a suf-
ficiently broad purpose, it too could approach pure private attorney
general status, simply by recruiting new members with the requisite
injury as needed.
A smaller organization with a sufficiently broad purpose could
also approach such status by exploiting recent wrinkles in standing
doctrine. Remember that an organization seeking standing under
Hunt must proffer a member with standing—with injury in fact,
traceability, and redressability.210 Although we often think of
“injury” as encompassing direct physical, economic, recreational, or
aesthetic harm, the federal courts have made clear that risk of
208. See DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM (2016), https://
democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BDQ-
57KU]; REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, https://prod-cdn-static.gop.
com/static/home/data/platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV45-HFFV].
209. See Citizens Coal Council v. Matt Canestrale Contracting, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 3d 632,
641-42 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (finding standing where an organization concededly recruited new
members to satisfy the Hunt doctrine; the court stated, “There is simply nothing in-
appropriate with an organization engaging in a grassroots effort to recruit members who
share common interests with the mission of the organization”). Courts have forbidden or-
ganizations to proceed when the timing of new membership led to circumvention of deadlines
or statutes of limitation. See, e.g., Petro-Chem Processing, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.2d 433, 436-37
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that allowing standing based on new members would circumvent
timing for filing petitions for review under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act when
the members did not join until after petitions were filed).
210. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978).
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future harm can suffice as an injury.211 Once risk can give rise to
standing, it becomes far easier for an association to identify a
member with standing because risks are often widely shared. Some
courts even allowed the organization to proceed without identifying
a specific member on the assumption that all the group’s members
have standing: “When the alleged harm is prospective, we have not
required that the organizational plaintiffs name names because
every member faces a probability of harm in the near and definite
future.”212
The Supreme Court may have rejected the permissibility of sta-
tistical standing based on risk of future harm. In Summers v. Earth
Island Institute,213 which involved challenges to U.S. Forest Service
salvage-timber sales, the Court denied standing based on a sta-
tistical argument,214 which the Court said “would make a mockery
of our prior cases.”215 However, Summers did not actually involve
the kind of statistical risk involved in the lower-court cases
211. See, e.g., Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-68 (1980). For discussions of the problems
of the Court’s stingy approach to risk-based standing, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage
Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA.
L. REV. 633, 698 (2006); F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55,
57-58 (2012); Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing
Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391, 394-95 (2009); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the
Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 511-15 (2008) [hereinafter Nash, Pre-
cautionary Principle]; Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1283, 1285 (2013) [hereinafter Nash, Expected Value].
212. Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1160 (11th Cir.
2008); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Natural
Resources Defense Council court held that the NRDC had satisfied Hunt because it had
introduced statistical evidence that the EPA’s rule regarding the chemical methyl bromide
would lead to an increased lifetime risk of death of 1 in 200,000. Id. at 7. Because the NRDC
had “nearly half a million members,” “two to four” of those members would “develop cancer
as a result of the rule.” Id. Of course, this represents a misunderstanding of the science of
risk: it is possible that no NRDC members will get cancer, or that twenty will. See L. Maaike
Helmus & Kelly M. Babchishin, Primer on Risk Assessment and the Statistics Used to Evalute
Its Accuracy, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 8, 9 (2017) (“[I]t is not possible to know with certainty
whether [the event] will occur, until and unless it does (and gets detected).”); see also Nash,
Expected Value, supra note 211, at 1298-1303.
213. 555 U.S. 488, 494-96 (2009). The Court held that Earth Island lacked standing,
because it had identified no members who used the relevant tracts of land. Id. Earth Island
had identified one member who used one tract, but that tract was then withdrawn from the
contested sale. Id. The Court would not allow Earth Island to substitute another member who
used a tract still included in the sale. Id. at 495-96.
214. Id. at 497.
215. Id. at 498.
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discussed earlier; Earth Island did not need statistics to determine
which of its members actually used the relevant tracts affected by
the salvage sales.216 In a true situation of risk, we cannot specifically
identify anyone who will be so affected—science just tells us that
someone is likely to be.
Most courts that address issues of risk and standing focus not on
the ultimate consequence (death, illness, etc.), but on the increased
risk of those consequences. In other words, individuals may show
standing based on the increased risk they face, as the Supreme
Court has recognized, rather than being required to show that they
actually will die or get sick.217 Although only a few individuals will
ultimately become ill or die, many people face the risk. The Court
has also noted that immediate injury can occur when one is faced
with risk, if one must expend funds to monitor the risk.218
And, because associations have standing wherever their mem-
bers have standing, associations may base their standing on the
risks that their members face. Indeed, as some have suggested,
216. Earth Island either had members who used the relevant tracts or it did not; there is
no “risk” that its members will use the tracts in the future because they either will or they
will not. Jonathan Nash argues that the case does not even purport to reject statistical
standing. Nash, Expected Value, supra note 211, at 1294-96. Courts, however, have in-
terpreted Summers to do so. See Swanson Grp. Mfg. v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 235, 244 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (“[A] statistical probability of injury to an unnamed member is insufficient to confer
standing on the organizations.” (citing Summers, 55 U.S. at 498-99)).
217. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (“The likelihood of en-
forcement, with the concomitant probability that a landlord’s rent will be reduced below what
he or she would otherwise be able to obtain in the absence of the Ordinance, is a sufficient
threat of actual injury.”); Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (requiring “a
realistic danger” of injury). It is thus well established that risk of future harm can suffice for
injury in fact, while considerable debate remains about the level of risk sufficient to meet the
Article III standard. See, e.g., Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006);
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated on reh’g, 464 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2006); Harris v. Bd. of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 2004); Cent. Delta
Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] credible threat of harm
is sufficient to constitute actual injury for standing purposes.”); Mountain States Legal Found.
v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The more drastic the injury that gov-
ernment action makes more likely, the lesser the increment of probability necessary to
establish standing.”); Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“That this injury is couched in terms of future impairment rather than past impairment is
of no moment.”); Dimarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1978).
218. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 154-55 (2010) (finding that the
ongoing risk of transmission of modified genes to the plaintiff farmers’ crops required “certain
measures to minimize the likelihood of potential contamination” and constituted injury in
fact).
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associations may be better plaintiffs in such contexts than the
individual members given the collective action problems in respond-
ing to risk.219 Risks can be widely spread, so that an organization
with a relatively small number of members will nonetheless be
likely to have a member within the relevant at-risk population. That
organization will thus be able to satisfy Hunt if it can satisfy the
germaneness prong; the broader the organization’s purpose, the
more likely it will have associational standing.
The limiting principle here is the scope of issues that might be
subject to a risk analysis and thus give rise to standing based on a
member’s risk. Courts have allowed risk to satisfy the standing
doctrine in a variety of areas: environmental risk,220 enforcement
risk,221 workplace risk,222 economic risk,223 food-borne risk,224 and
medical risk.225 The interaction of risk-based standing and Hunt
therefore readily permits suit by groups with broad purposes.
The Supreme Court has also conferred broad standing in the
procedural context. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court
acknowledged that the Article III standing test, if applied strictly,
would preclude most lawsuits against the government for failure to
comply with procedural statutes such as the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act and the National Environmental Policy Act; as a result,
the test was applied less strictly in those cases.226 Under this idea
of “procedural standing,” a plaintiff must still show that she has a
concrete interest in the agency action, akin to meeting the injury-in-
fact requirement.227 But she need not meet the same requirements
of traceability and redress as plaintiffs in other cases because it is
impossible to show that following the proper procedures will result
in averting the potential injury.228
219. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505-06 (2007).
221. See, e.g., Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 293-94.
222. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. FDA, 710 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2013).
223. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).
224. See, e.g., Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir. 2003).
225. See, e.g., Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 570 (6th Cir. 2005).
226. 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
227. Id. at 572 (explaining that the plaintiff must be able “to allege a[ ] discrete injury
flowing from th[e procedural] failure”).
228. Id. at 572 n.7 (“Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency’s
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Such expansive procedural standing, such as risk-based standing,
could readily give even a small organization with a broad purpose
access to the federal courts under Hunt if the organization seeks to
challenge a procedural failing. The organization would need only
find one of the many people with a concrete interest in the par-
ticular government project, recruit that person as a member, and
invoke that member’s concrete interest.
Finally, one can readily hypothesize an organization with a pur-
pose that precisely overlaps with the pure private attorney general’s
desire to litigate. Imagine an Organization of Americans for the
Rule of Law (OARL), whose explicit purpose is to protect our dem-
ocratic republic from recent assaults on its integrity by suing
anyone OARL concludes has committed an egregious violation of
legal standards.229 OARL is organized in a way that undoubtedly fits
the courts’ doctrine on membership organizations, so that it can
invoke Hunt as a basis of standing.230 OARL could become very
popular, so that it quickly grows quite large and thus is likely to
have a member with standing for any particular violation of the rule
of law. Or OARL could successfully recruit a member with standing
for each lawsuit it seeks to bring.
The members themselves would have to have Article III standing:
they could not be mere interested bystanders, outraged by violations
of the law.231 But it is not hard to imagine finding a suitable member
with standing for most lawsuits OARL might with to bring. For
example, recent Emoluments Clause litigation, has argued that
President Trump’s hotels (including the restaurants within them)
have illegally profited from his office; at least one of those cases
relies on the harm caused to employees at competing restaurants to
satisfy Article III associational standing requirements.232 If those
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with
any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even
though the dam will not be completed for many years.”).
229. See, e.g., TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE, AMERICA
COVER COPY, 9-12 (2018) (arguing that western democratic institutions are under assault,
and that we face a turning point “between equality and oligarchy, individuality and totality,
and truth and falsehood”).
230. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
231. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572-74.
232. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 13, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v.
Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA, 2017 WL 2734681 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2017).
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employees joined OARL, then OARL could pursue the Emoluments
Clause litigation.
On this description, would OARL not be the quintessential pure
private attorney general? Yet, under Hunt and the cases that
interpret Hunt, OARL would appear to be an acceptable member-
ship organization, able to litigate based on its members’ standing.
B. Cities
Cities233 provide perhaps the most interesting case of institution-
al standing for an amorphous group, in part because of a recent
surge of academic attention to cities as impact litigators.234 Indeed,
over the last two decades, cities have emerged as important plain-
tiffs. More than 2000 U.S. cities and counties sued Purdue Pharma
over the opioid crisis.235 Miami, Baltimore, Oakland, Los Angeles,
233. While my discussion here focuses on cities, the analysis arguably applies to any local
political jurisdiction, including counties. I do not discuss organizational standing for states,
as states may sue in parens patriae and receive “special solicitude” in standing analysis. See
supra note 28. I also do not discuss organizational standing for Native American tribes,
because the question of whether tribes can sue in parens patriae appears vexed. See Bradford
C. Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases: Traceable Standing
Causation Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 869, 899-900, 900
n.237. If tribes cannot sue in parens patriae, then the arguments made regarding
municipalities in the articles cited below could presumably be extended to them. See infra
note 247.
234. See Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L. REV. 59,
59 (2014); Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of
Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 389 (2006); Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local
Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903,
1903 (2013); Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012); Michael Sarbanes & Kathleen Skullney, Taking Communities
Seriously: Should Community Associations Have Standing in Maryland?, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 283, 284 (1995) (discussing the possibility of standing for community asso-
ciations); Eli Savit, States Empowering Plaintiff Cities, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 581, 602,
604-06 (2019); Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1229-32 (2018). See
generally Kathleen S. Morris, Cities Seeking Justice: Local Government Litigation in the
Public Interest, in HOW CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF
POPULATION FLOWS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 189 (Ray Brescia & John
Travis Marshall eds., 2016) [hereinafter Cities Seeking Justice].
235. Lenny Bernstein, et al., Purdue Pharma Reaches Tentative Deal in Federal, State
Opioid Lawsuits, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
health/purdue-pharma-reaches-tentative-settlement-in-federal-lawsuit-and-some-state-
litigation/2019/09/11/ce6cb942-d4b8-11e9-9343-40db57cf6abd_story.html [https://perma.cc/H
8JF-YT85] (describing settlement of opioid litigation “with 23 states and more than 2,000
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and Chicago sued banks over the 2008 mortgage crisis.236 New York
City and eight California municipalities sued ExxonMobil over
global climate change.237 Several cities joined states to challenge the
Trump administration’s citizenship question for the 2020 census.238
The City of San Francisco even has an Affirmative Litigation Task
Force, which operates like a nonprofit public interest law firm
within the City Attorney’s Office and has litigated a wide variety of
prominent issues, including marriage equality, immigrants’ rights,
financial consumer protection, consumer privacy, and wage theft.239
The increasing number of impact litigation cases brought by cities
has led to increasing attention, both in cases240 and in academic lit-
erature,241 to the standing of cities to litigate. Because they can be
large and have broad purposes, can cities approach the status of
cities and counties”).
236. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Says Cities Can Sue Big Banks over Housing Bubble
Damages, WASH. POST (May 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/
cities-may-sue-big-banks-over-predatory-lending-damage-supreme-court-rules/2017/
05/01/cf8c108a-2e79-11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html [https://perma.cc/LE3M-X88V]; see
also Cities Seeking Justice, supra note 234, at 190.
237. Natasha Geiling, The List of Cities Suing Major Fossil Fuel Companies over Climate
Change Just Got Longer, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 23, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/
richmond-california-climate-lawsuit-478382e0d16e/ [https://perma.cc/QAL3-T672].
238. Larry Neumeister, States, Cities Sue U.S. Government over Census Citizenship Ques-
tion, CHI. TRIBUNE (Apr. 3, 2018, 12:55 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/
ct-census-citizenship-question-lawsuit-20180403-story.html [https://perma.cc/LZ52-B48Z].
239. Affirmative Litigation, CITY ATT’Y OF S.F., https://www.sfcityattorney.org/aboutus/
teams/affirmative-litigation [https://perma.cc/DC52-2HW6]. The Task Force works with stu-
dents from Yale University’s “San Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project ... [which] is a
partnership between Yale Law School and the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office ... [that]
conceive[s], develop[s], and litigate[s] some of the most innovative public-interest lawsuits in
the country—lawsuits that tackle problems with local dimensions but national effects.” San
Francisco Affirmative Litigation Project, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/
clinical-and-experiential-learning/our-clinics/san-francisco-affirmative-litigation-project
[https://perma.cc/24R5-KNA2].
240. See, e.g., Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Berretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d
536, 539 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying standing because the connection between injury and
defendant’s action was too tenuous); City of Birmingham v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-
S, 2009 WL 8652915, at *1, *4-5 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009) (same).
241. See generally Caruso, supra note 234; Engel, supra note 234; Savit, supra note 234;
Swan, supra note 234.
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pure private242 attorney general under Hunt? This Subpart ad-
dresses these questions.243
Cities, of course, may have direct standing to sue. Cities suing Big
Pharma, for example, have made direct standing arguments by
pointing to the huge costs imposed by the opioid crisis.244 San
Francisco similarly alleged that it was directly harmed by Califor-
nia’s then-existing ban on marriage between same-sex couples; the
city cited costs expended on social services and loss of revenue.245
242. Those who act for cities are ultimately controlled by elections; they do not seem
“private” in the way that, for example, the Sierra Club is a private (as opposed to public)
organization. But because cities do not have access to the courts in the same way that states
and the federal government do, see infra notes 244-50 and accompanying text, and because
my focus here is on those who argue that cities should be treated in the same way as private
associations, see infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text, I make the (admittedly imperfect)
decision to treat cities as potential private attorneys general.
243. The standing question must be separated from the question of whether the mu-
nicipality has capacity to sue under state law. Here a brief primer on local government law
is helpful. In general, municipalities have no authority other than that delegated to them by
state governments. 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2:6 (5th ed. 2019).
Many states delegate power in gross, giving municipalities the power of “home-rule.” Id. In
such states, municipalities may exercise any power the state has, unless specifically pre-
empted by state law. Id. At least one state has a constitutional provision prohibiting state
preemption. See COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (providing home rule and stating that municipal
laws “shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town
any law of the state in conflict therewith”). Municipalities in home-rule states thus always
have the capacity to initiate lawsuits. See SALKIN, supra, § 2.6.
Other states delegate power far more narrowly. In states that follow “Dillon’s Rule,”
municipalities may exercise only such powers as are delegated to them in state legislation,
statute by statute. 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW & GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 1.18
(2d ed. 2011). Municipalities in such states would have to point to the state statutes
authorizing them (either explicitly or implicitly) to bring particular lawsuits. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 11-1-2 (1975) (“Every county is a body corporate, with power to sue or be sued in any
court of record.”); id. § 11-40-1 (“All municipal organizations now existing in the State of
Alabama ... and all towns and cities that may hereafter be incorporated under the provisions
of this title shall be bodies politic and corporate ... and each under such name as the ‘City of
........’ or ‘Town of ........,’ as the case may be, shall sue and be sued.”).
244. See Nino C. Monea, Cities v. Big Pharma: Municipal Affirmative Litigation & the
Opioid Crisis, A.B.A. (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/state_local_government/
publications/urban_lawyer/2019/spring/opioid/ [https://perma.cc/56FA-9NYW]. A New York
City complaint, for example, alleged that New York has “spen[t] millions of dollars on
substance abuse treatment programs, hospital services, emergency medical services and law
enforcement.” J. David Goodman & William Neuman, New York City Sues Drug Companies
over Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/ny
region/nyc-de-blasio-opioid-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/YYK5-2NVH].
245. Complaint in Intervention for Declaratory, Injunctive or Other Relief at 4, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 VRW, 2009 WL 2628360 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2009) (citing
“health care, welfare benefits, and other social services to citizens whose mental and physical
1372 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1329
But when cities do not have direct standing, they apparently have
no parens patriae standing as the federal government or the states
do.246 Some cities have therefore turned to Hunt.247 But are the cit-
izens of municipalities “members” of cities in the same way that the
Sierra Club has members?248 And do cities have “purposes” in the
same way that corporations and nonprofit organizations do?249
Although the common-sense response might be “no,”250 the way the
cases have evolved in the lower courts suggests that cities may, in
fact, meet the Hunt test.
health suffers because of discrimination and to citizens who become dependent on public
resources when families disintegrate” and loss of “revenue that would be generated by the
weddings of same-sex couples and associated tourism”).
246. Parens patriae literally means “parent of the country.” Parens patriae, OXFORD ENG.
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/137815?redirectedFrom=parens+patriae#eid
[https://perma.cc/C26G-39D9]. The parens patriae doctrine allows the federal and state
governments to sue on behalf of their citizens when a sufficiently broad swath of citizens is
harmed and the government sues to protect their health and welfare. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3531.11 (dating
doctrine of federal parens patriae to In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895)); id. § 3531.11.1
(describing Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982), as
the leading case on state parens patriae). See generally F. Andrew Hessick, Quasi-Sovereign
Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1927 (2019). Cities have contended that they too can invoke
the health and welfare of their citizens as a basis for standing in federal courts; but most
courts to address the question have concluded that municipalities have no authority to
proceed in parens patriae. See Caruso, supra note 234, at 69-71 (collecting and analyzing
cases). Indeed, one commentator stated flatly that “[t]he federal courts have unequivocally
held that political subdivisions cannot bring claims as parens patriae because their power is
derivative, not sovereign.” Engel, supra note 234, at 365; see also Savit, supra note 234, at
602-06. There is some uncertainty in the case law about whether the ability to sue in parens
patriae is inherent in the sovereign status of the state or is merely a special form of rep-
resentational litigation. Compare Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602 (“[There are] a set of interests that
the State has in the well-being of its populace.”), with Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] State asserting quasi-sovereign interests as parens
patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III.”).
247. E.g., City of Stamps v. ALCOA, Inc., No. 05-1049, 2006 WL 2254406, at *5-6 (W.D.
Ark. Aug. 7, 2006) (allowing city to proceed under Hunt).
248. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 730 (1972).
249. See Burnham, supra note 156, at 185.
250. See, e.g., City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 267-68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The
City’s analogy of its representation of its citizens to a private organization’s representation
of its members misconceives the very concept of associational standing.... The City does not
have ‘members’ who have voluntarily associated, nor are the interests it seeks to assert here
germane to its purpose.”).
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1. Membership in Cities
The argument that cities have members seems, at first, to rely on
a false analogy. One is simply not a “member” of a city the way one
might be a member of the Sierra Club or the ACLU. If I ask my
neighbor what her relationship to the city of Tuscaloosa is, she
might say “I live in Tuscaloosa” or “I am a resident of Tuscaloosa,”
but it seems highly unlikely that she would say “I am a member of
Tuscaloosa.”251
An underlying intuition may be that I am not as free to quit
Tuscaloosa as I am to quit the Sierra Club. So, for example, Collins
English Dictionary says that “[a] member of an organization such
as a club or a political party is a person who has officially joined
the organization.”252 It is far easier for me to join or quit the Sierra
Club than it is for me to join or quit the city of Tuscaloosa, and thus
the voluntary nature of my Sierra Club membership can be dis-
tinguished from my less voluntary “membership” in Tuscaloosa.
Contrary to the intuition that volition should be considered a char-
acteristic of membership in the Hunt sense, however, I am consid-
ered a member of many things that I have not officially chosen to be
part of: I am a member of society and a member of the public.253
And, indeed, freedom to join or quit the membership of an
association has not actually been considered necessary for associa-
tional standing. Hunt itself involved an organization with compul-
sory “membership”: “Nor do we find it significant in determining
whether the Commission may properly represent its constituency
that ‘membership’ is ‘compelled’ in the form of mandatory assess-
ments.”254 The Court compared membership in the Apple Advertis-
ing Commission to membership in a union or a state bar association,
which is often mandatory, “[y]et in neither instance would it be
251. Cf. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1089 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“But
who wouldn't raise an eyebrow if a neighbor, when asked to identify something similar to a
‘record’ or ‘document,’ said ‘crocodile’?”).
252. Member, COLLINS ENG. DICTIONARY (emphasis added), https://www.collinsdictionary.
com/dictionary/english/member [https://perma.cc/5ZBU-LN8N].
253. See, e.g., Member, n. and adj., OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/116296 [https://perma.cc/JVZ8-DXED] (giving as example under the word “member,”
“I should be happy, if I were a useful member of society” (quoting 1 MARIA EDGEWORTH,
MORAL TALES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 78 (1801))).
254. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977).
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reasonable to suggest that such an organization lacked standing to
assert the claims of its constituents.”255
The Hunt Court noted the ways in which the Apple Advertising
Commission was like a traditional membership organization:
They alone elect the members of the Commission; they alone
may serve on the Commission; they alone finance its activities,
including the costs of this lawsuit, through assessments levied
upon them. In a very real sense, therefore, the Commission ...
provides the means by which [its members] express their
collective views and protect their collective interests.256
These factors, and not the voluntariness of the membership, were
relevant to the Court in determining whether the Commission could
assert the claims of its members.257
Are cities the same? One arguably has as much or more choice
about one’s decision to remain in a city as the apple growers in Hunt
had regarding their membership in the Apple Advertising Com-
mission; to quit the Commission, an apple grower would have had
to stop growing apples and, to quit a city, one would have to move.258
And, like the apple growers, city voters (though not all city resi-
dents) elect the leaders of the city and city taxpayers (though not all
city residents) fund the city’s activities.259
Some cases support treating cities as membership organiza-
tions.260 A number of governmental entities, including the Apple
255. Id.
256. Id. at 344-45.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 336-37.
259. Swan, supra note 234, at 1258. (“[C]ity residents alone elect, comprise, and at least
partially finance their local government. This gives city residents a better claim to ‘mem-
bership’ than many members of litigating associations, who may donate to an organization
but have no real further hand in its activities.”) Note that Professor Swan uses the term
“residents”; while some local jurisdictions allow noncitizens to vote, in most localities voting
rights are restricted not only to those who are residents but also to those who are citizens of
the United States. E.g., Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law
and Current Prospects for Change, 18 LAW & INEQ. 271, 276 (2000); David M. Howard, Note,
Potential Citizens’ Rights: The Case for Permanent Resident Voting, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1393,
1393-95 (2017). And, of course, many people (especially those under eighteen) reside in cities
without voting or paying taxes. 
260. It is worth noting that an elitist set of assumptions seems to underlie the idea of
citizens as “members” in the membership-organization sense. Professor Swan, for example,
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Advertising Commission in Hunt itself, have been permitted to
proceed under Hunt, which suggests that cities, as governmental
entities, should also be able to invoke Hunt.261 And cities have al-
ready invoked associational standing with some success.262 Argu-
ably, then, a city could invoke the Hunt test to sue based on the
injury of one of its citizens.
At the same time, however, defining the “membership” of a
municipality presents trick questions. Who counts as a “member”?
All residents of the municipality? All residents who are citizens? All
residents who are of voting age? What about cities that impose
commuter taxes—are those commuters also “members” of the
says, “People tend to ‘emotionally affiliate with their city of residence,’ and ‘[a] city can argue
that its residents chose where to live’ and who ‘to affiliate with,’ and thus, in some sense, have
also chosen ‘to be represented by [ ] that city.’” Swan, supra note 234, at 1258 (alterations in
original) (quoting Caruso, supra note 234, at 76). This assumes that the resident is wealthy
enough to be able to think about changing cities. Yet, of course, many people live in cities
because they were born there or because their families moved them there, and due to lack of
resources have never been able to leave. Thus, if Hunt applies to municipalities, a city would
be able to show standing under Hunt by claiming to represent the interests of its “members,”
even if those “members” might actually want to live elsewhere. However, as noted above, the
voluntariness of membership plays no role in Hunt, which itself involved an involuntary
organization. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2003) (protection
and advocacy agency); Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 850 F. Supp. 1388,
1414 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (water district); Meek v. Martinez, 724 F. Supp. 888, 901 (S.D. Fla.
1987) (advocacy agency).
262. See City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 697-99 (7th Cir. 1976) (recognizing the
applicability of Hunt to cities but finding that the city did not satisfy Hunt factors in this
case); City of Stamps v. ALCOA, Inc., No. 05-1049, 2006 WL 2254406, at *5-6 (W.D. Ark. Aug.
7, 2006) (applying the Hunt analysis and recognizing standing). At least two courts have
clearly rejected Hunt standing for cities. See City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 267-
68 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Bd. of Supervisors v. Va. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 731 F. Supp. 735, 741-42
(W.D. Va. 1990).
Those arguing for the application of the associational standing doctrine to municipalities
also frequently point to Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Snapp, where, in the course of
approving parens patriae standing for Puerto Rico, Justice Brennan approvingly cited
standing for municipalities. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 612 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring). But the city he refers to had established standing
on its own account, not by using the Hunt factors. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-11 (1979). Brennan did suggest that states, municipalities, and
private associations should all be treated similarly. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 611-12 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“At the very least, the prerogative of a State to bring suits in federal court should
be commensurate with the ability of private organizations.”). But Justice Brennan referred
only to direct organizational standing. Id. at 611 (“A private organization may bring suit to
vindicate its own concrete interest in performing those activities for which it was formed.”).
1376 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1329
municipality?263 Membership in the Sierra Club is straightforward;
membership in a municipality requires more definition.
Moreover, as others have pointed out, associational standing
makes cities better off than states suing in parens patriae:264 parens
patriae requires the state to show that it sues to vindicate the rights
of “an identifiable group of individual residents,”265 while associa-
tional standing can arise from one single member. This asymmetry
suggests that the use of associational standing for cities is at least
somewhat problematic.266
2. Cities’ Purposes
The germaneness prong of Hunt presents the same analysis as
the member-with-standing prong: an initial examination prompts
one to say, “Of course cities don’t have purposes in the way that
membership organizations do.”267 But the case law, if not definitive,
remains open to the argument that cities can invoke Hunt.268
Municipalities do not intuitively fit the mold of an association
that “provides the means by which [its members] express their
collective views and protect their collective interests.”269 As noted
above, some commentators assume that organizations have “a par-
ticular purpose, be it fair housing, separation of church and state,
or protection of the environment.”270 Cities, of course, have far
broader purposes than this.
263. I am indebted to Jonathan Nash for these questions.
264. See Crocker, supra note 16, at 2079-80; Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State
Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 112-13 (2018).
265. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
266. One solution, of course, is to extend associational standing to states as well. This is
Professor Crocker’s argument. See Crocker, supra note 16, at 2059. Applying associational
standing to states would make my argument regarding nearly pure private attorneys general
even stronger; California, for example, has nearly forty million residents, much larger than
any city (and ever so slightly larger than AARP). Compare Quick Facts: California, United
States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/CA,
US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/36DL-QJKK], with AM. SOC’Y OF ASS’N EXECS., supra note
197, at 11. 
267. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977); cf. Crocker,
supra note 16, at 2072 (describing the idea of a state’s purpose as “metaphysical”).
268. See infra Part II.B.
269. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345.
270. Burnham, supra note 156, at 185 (emphasis added).
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A city with home-rule powers, for example, has quite broad
powers.271 Indeed, the original idea of home rule was to “giv[e] the
cities to whom such rule was granted full-fledged sovereignty over
local affairs, thus bringing about dual state and local sovereignty
along the national plan of federal and state governments.”272 Even
though “such local sovereignty has never developed,”273 cities with
home-rule powers engage not only in the activities we typically asso-
ciate with cities—such as providing water and sewer services, police
protection, emergency services, public transit, garbage collection,
parks, schools, libraries, and food inspection—but also in activities
as far-flung as providing fiber-optic cable networks,274 owning and
managing art museums,275 expanding antidiscrimination protec-
tions,276 and increasing the minimum wage,277 though states do act
to remove certain areas from local authority.278 Even cities without
home-rule powers279 are not much less kaleidoscopic in their pur-
poses.280 Most states have conferred on their municipalities ex-
pansive powers of governance.281
But such breadth of purpose is not at all fatal to the application
of Hunt. As noted above, courts generally interpret Hunt’s ger-
maneness prong expansively.282 And organizational purpose can be
very broad.283 It therefore seems quite possible that federal courts
could permit cities to proceed under Hunt.
271. See supra note 243.
272. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 35 (1982).
273. Id.
274. See Will San Francisco’s City-Wide Fiber Optic Network Succeed? 10 Tech Pros Weigh
In, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/
01/09/will-san-franciscos-city-wide-fiber-optic-network-succeed-10-tech-pros-weigh-in/
[https://perma.cc/V25J-UCBE].
275. See Alan Greenblatt, Detroit Museum Not the First to Consider Selling Out, NPR (June
2, 2013, 3:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/06/02/187545463/detroit-museum-not-the-first-to-
consider-selling-out [https://perma.cc/8Q7K-BCQL].
276. See Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation: State Preemption of Progressive
Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225, 2226 (2017).
277. Id.
278. See id. at 2227-28; see also Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96
TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1164-65 (2018).
279. See supra note 243 (discussing Dillon’s Rule).
280. See KUSHNER, supra note 243, § 1.18.
281. See REYNOLDS, supra note 272, § 35.
282. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text. 
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3. Cities as Pure Private Attorneys General
If, indeed, Hunt can be applied to justify standing for cities, then
cities—like AARP, national political parties, groups that recruit
new members when they want to sue, groups that take advantage
of standing doctrine’s recognition of risk-based and procedural
injuries, and the hypothetical Organization of Americans for the
Rule of Law284—could conceivably act as pure private attorneys
general. Cities exercise the police power: they protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens.285 Cities can also be very large.
Take New York City. It has a population of 8.4 million people,286
so it is quite likely that the city could find one resident with the
requisite injury for a particular lawsuit. It also (technically) has
home rule so any lawsuit is likely to be germane to its purpose.287
New York City would therefore have very wide latitude in the suits
it can bring, using Hunt as a basis for standing.288 And if New York
City can bring almost any lawsuit, has it not become a pure private
attorney general—private at least in the sense that it is not the at-
torney general of the United States or of New York State?
Of course, there are presumably some limits on New York City’s
standing under Hunt. For example, even if New York City identified
a citizen—or thousands of them—who owned property in Florida
and spent part of the year there, it might not be appropriate to
recognize the city’s associational standing to bring a lawsuit re-
garding property rights or climate change affecting those Florida
properties. This not only seems outside the city’s purpose, but also
because—if it fits under New York City’s police power to care about
284. See supra Part II.A. 
285. See supra notes 271-81 and accompanying text.
286. Population—Current and Projected Populations; NYC CITY PLANNING, http://www1.
nyc.gov/site/planning/planning-level/nyc-population/current-future-populations.page
[https://perma.cc/KFU5-2LYL].
287. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2. But see Jesse McKinley, Why Can’t New York City Govern
Its Own Affairs?, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/nyregion/
nyc-home-rule-state-laws.html [https://perma.cc/EB8J-A4JW] (contending that state preemp-
tion has limited home rule in New York State). Even if state preemption has placed
substantial limits on areas that New York City may directly regulate, such preemption
presumably does not limit the areas in which the city can show a purpose or interest under
Hunt. See id. (noting that, in areas where local laws are preempted, New York City has
lobbied state government to enact laws that comport with the city’s goals).
288. See supra text accompanying notes 271-83.
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the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens even in Florida—there
are comity and extraterritoriality issues with permitting New York
City to use the courts to litigate about conditions in Florida.289 But
it would seem appropriate for New York City to sue about events in
Florida that might come home to the city itself, such as disease-
causing events that would cause New York City healthcare expenses
to rise.290
New York City may also be more constrained than an association
would be in recruiting new members to give it standing for a
particular lawsuit.291 Such recruitment is more difficult for a mu-
nicipality, because it is more difficult for a person to change her
residence than it is for her to join a membership organization.
Therefore, there may be more inherent limits on the flexibility of
municipalities in invoking Hunt. Cities do, however, recruit new
members with some success.292
Apart from geographic limits and difficulties in gaining new
“members,” however, New York City (or any other large city) could
arguably decide to litigate in order to vindicate the full range of
issues that capture its attention. And, as demonstrated by the
litigation already pursued by cities, the issues are endless: the
opioid crisis, gun violence, marriage equality, immigration, climate
change, wage theft, discriminatory lending, and the national
289. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 582-83 (1986). Issues regarding extraterritorial regulation by cities have traditionally
arisen in the land-use context, though recent city efforts have extended to other policy issues.
See Steven M. Wise et al., The Power of Municipalities to Enact Legislation Granting Legal
Rights to Nonhuman Animals Pursuant to Home Rule, 67 SYRACUSE L. REV. 31, 51-54 (2017)
(discussing local ordinances resulting in extraterritorial effect regarding equal treatment for
those in domestic partnerships, the provision of a living wage for city residents, and the
banning of the sale of foie gras).
290. The question of extraterritoriality also has echoes in recent debates on nationwide
injunctions, where “one district court judge ... declare[s] a federal statute, regulation, or policy
invalid and prevent[s] the Executive Branch from enforcing it anywhere or against anyone.”
Alan M. Trammel, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. 67, 68 (2019).
291. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. 
292. E.g., Meredith Cohn, Surgical Robot Maker Gains New Investment After Moving to
Baltimore Opportunity Zone from Silicon Valley, MSN (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.msn.com/
en-us/news/technology/surgical-robot-maker-gains-new-investment-after-moving-to-baltimore-
opportunity-zone-from-silicon-valley/ar-AAJWzKQ [https://perma.cc/D92C-3A5W] (citing tax
breaks and other incentives for company to relocate to Baltimore).
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census.293 Cities therefore are poised—if Hunt applies to them—to
become nearly pure private attorneys general.
C. Conflict in the Doctrine
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has long held that the
Constitution forbids pure private attorneys general—litigants who
sue simply to vindicate the rule of law. Instead, all plaintiffs must
show the requisite personal stake to satisfy the Article III standing
test.294 After all, the Court has emphasized that “[t]he judicial power
... is not an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutional-
ity of legislative or executive acts”295 and instead “is legitimate only
in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy.”296
But if Hunt allows extremely broad associational standing, as
the above analysis has shown, certain organizations and cities start
to look a lot like plaintiffs with a roving commission to sue in the
public interest. In other words, they look a lot like the pure private
attorneys general that Sierra Club supposedly forbids.297 That no
one appears to have noticed this is of a piece with the general
incoherence of the standing doctrine.
1. The Tension Between Hunt and Sierra Club
The ban on pure private attorneys general is part of the Court’s
larger mission with standing doctrine: that it helps maintain “the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic
society.”298 Courts are supposed to stick “to questions presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
293. See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part I.B.2.
295. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982)).
296. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471 (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman,
143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
297. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-41 (1972).
298. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see Elliott, Functions, supra note 17, at 499-
501.
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resolution through the judicial process.”299 Hearing cases brought by
pure private attorneys general, the Court said in Sierra Club, takes
courts beyond their Article III boundaries.300
Yet, if my analysis above is correct, Hunt permits at least some,
and perhaps many, organizations and municipalities to act as nearly
pure private attorneys general. Indeed, associational standing likely
generates more litigation than would occur in its absence. As dis-
cussed above, individual litigation, particularly in situations of
widely spread harms, is subject to problems of transaction costs and
free riding.301 It is for precisely these reasons that class actions were
created (though that device has not overcome these collective action
problems).302 Organizations, to some extent, can also overcome the
collective action problems that beset individuals,303 and bring law-
suits that no individual would have proper incentive to bring.304
Associations, like litigation classes, help overcome barriers to col-
lective action and permit litigation that might not otherwise oc-
cur.305
299. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
95 (1968)).
300. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739-40.
301. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
302. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The aggregation of
individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government. Where it is not eco-
nomically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small
individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless
they may employ the class-action device.”); Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence:
Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 81 (2007); supra
Part 1.C.3 (discussing relationship between associational standing and class actions).
303. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 308-10 (1989).
304. The Court rejected the argument that association lawsuits are required to proceed as
class actions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and 24 and noted that Hunt’s
doctrine of associational standing recognizes that the primary reason people join
an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests
that they share with others. “The only practical judicial policy when people pool
their capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and form that will
identify collective interests, often is to permit the association or corporation in
a single case to vindicate the interests of all.”
Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
305. See Leslie, supra, note 302, at 74; see also supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text
(discussing attorneys’ fees in public-interest litigation).
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Moreover, Hunt requires associations to proffer only one member
with standing.306 Professor Tara Grove has argued that standing
“curtails private prosecutorial discretion”: a private litigant must
show injury in fact, can sue only defendants that caused her injury,
and (for the most part) can seek relief only for the harms she alleges
to herself.307 As Professor Grove acknowledges, associations, espe-
cially national associations, have more latitude, because they can
more readily find a member with standing.308 When that latitude is
combined with a large membership (or aggressive membership re-
cruitment) and a broad purpose, associations approach the status
of the pure private attorney general.
So, on the one hand, the Sierra Club Court clearly stated that
pure private attorneys general may not sue in federal court.309 Yet,
on the other hand, the Hunt Court appears to have permitted
organizations and municipalities, at least those with sufficient size
and breadth of purpose, to litigate almost any suit they choose—
and potentially to generate more such suits than would occur if only
individuals could sue.310 The tension between the two strands of
doctrine is obvious.
2. This Is Typical Standing Incoherence
The conflict between Hunt and Sierra Club is no surprise. As
noted above, standing doctrine has been widely criticized as
incoherent.311 The heretofore-unrecognized tension between Sierra
Club and Hunt is another example of this incoherence. It is black
letter law that no one can sue just because they are interested in
seeing the law enforced.312 And it is black letter law that organiza-
tions can sue when they have a member with standing and the suit
is germane to the organization’s purposes.313 Yet, as I have demon-
strated above, the evolution of doctrine under Hunt means that
many organizations can essentially do the former in the guise of the
306. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
307. Grove, supra note 5, at 808-11.
308. Id. at 812.
309. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736 (1972).
310. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
311. See supra Part I.A.2.
312. See supra Part I.B.2.
313. See supra Part I.C.2.
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latter—and thus serve as pure private attorneys general.314 The
doctrine both forbids and permits pure private attorneys general,
giving even more reason to consider it “incoherent”315 and “con-
fus[ed].”316
III. CLEARING UP THE CONFUSION
Once it becomes clear that Hunt’s associational standing can
permit certain organizations to act essentially as pure private
attorneys general, which is supposedly forbidden by Sierra Club,
then the question comes: What, if anything, should be done?
One answer would be for the Court to recognize that standing
doctrine—including Sierra Club’s ban on pure private attorneys
general—has taken a wrong turn. The tension between Hunt and
Sierra Club could be seen as the straw that breaks the back of
standing doctrine. Yet, as discussed below, standing doctrine has
been increasingly entrenched decade by decade, and such a revo-
lution in doctrine seems unlikely.
A second answer would be for Congress to take steps to regulate
the jurisdiction of the federal courts over associations. Congress is
well-placed to make the factual assessments and to draw the lines
required, and I lay out some of those possibilities below.317 Congress
is, however, unlikely to take the time to remedy Hunt.
The least-worst response, then, may be for the Court to take
modest steps to adjust standing doctrine to respond to the concerns
I raise here. The remainder of this Part discusses the doctrinal
modifications the Court could make to address the conflict between
Hunt and Sierra Club.
314. See supra Part II.A.
315. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 221.
316. Sunstein, Privatization, supra note 17, at 1458.
317. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 131 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he limitations
adopted by the Court [using the standing doctrine] are ... wholly untenable. This is the more
unfortunate because there is available a resolution of this problem that entirely satisfies the
demands of the principle of separation of powers. This Court has previously held that in-
dividual litigants have standing to represent the public interest, despite their lack of economic
or other personal interests, if Congress has appropriately authorized such suits.”).
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A. The Court Could Abandon Standing Doctrine
As noted above, modern standing doctrine has been heavily
criticized since it emerged in the early 1970s, with critics focused on
how disjointed, unpredictable, disingenuous, and ultra vires the
doctrine is.318 The previously unnoticed tension between the ban on
pure private attorneys general and the doctrine of associational
standing is of a piece with these criticisms. The Court could there-
fore abandon standing doctrine and, as many have urged before,
condition access to the federal courts using prudential and statutory
considerations.
For example, Professor William Fletcher argued more than thirty
years ago that the question of standing was hopelessly mixed up
with the merits question of whether a plaintiff stated a cause of
action.319 Why not simply abandon standing doctrine and return to
the question of whether a plaintiff states a cause of action?320 This
move is not uncontroversial, as Professor Ernest Young has argued:
relying solely on causes of action to determine who may proceed in
federal court, especially if that inquiry involves implying causes of
action, raises questions of judicial lawmaking now perceived as
illegitimate.321 He further asserts that it does not permit consider-
ation of certain structural aspects viewed as essential to standing
doctrine, including “separation of powers, federalism, and the need
to protect the quality of judicial decision-making.”322 The complexi-
ties of modern standing doctrine are not necessary for addressing
those concerns, however, as I think Professor Young would acknowl-
edge, even if more general questions into who may invoke the power
of the federal courts are required.323
318. See supra Part 1.A.2.
319. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 223-24; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 697 (listing
the question of whether a cause of action is asserted as one of four that can replace entire
structure of justiciability doctrine).
320. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA. L. REV. 417, 418 (2013)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s application of Article III standing doctrine in diversity
cases interfere with state authority to define substantive state law).
321. Ernest A. Young, In Praise of Judge Fletcher—and of General Standing Principles, 65
ALA. L. REV. 473, 477-80 (2013).
322. Id. at 476.
323. Id. at 488-89 (arguing for continued use of “general standing principles” and noting
that “[s]tanding doctrine arouses criticism because the questions it necessarily con-
fronts—who has the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and under what
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Many critics have argued that standing doctrine would be better
as a prudential doctrine.324 Professor Jaffe, for example, argued for
a prudential rather than a constitutional approach to threshold
questions like standing;325 Professors Jonathan Siegel and Mark
Tushnet have made similar arguments.326 I have argued that a
prudential approach to the issues raised by standing doctrine—for
example, whether a case presents a question that can be judicially
resolved or whether separation-of-powers issues counsel against
taking a case—allows for the transparent resolution of complicated
questions, is “preferable to a world where courts are forced to apply
a misconceived doctrine in an attempt to solve problems that the
doctrine simply cannot solve,”327 and “cut[s] short accusations that
... standing is merely a devious method to hidden ends.”328
But it is next to impossible to imagine the Court doing anything
like this. Standing doctrine in its current form has existed for more
than forty years, and the current Justices all treat it as en-
trenched.329
circumstances?— are simply hard questions.”).
324. See, e.g., Elliott, Functions, supra note 17, at 465, 471-72; Elliott, Inability, supra note
17, at 168, 177.
325. See Jaffe, supra note 83, at 1034-43 (suggesting an abstention doctrine to limit the
justiciability of suits brought to vindicate the public interest); see also Richard Murphy,
Abandoning Standing: Trading Rule of Access for a Rule of Deference, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 943,
989-90 (2008).
326. See Siegel, supra note 66, at 129-38 (recommending a variety of discretionary rules
of justiciability); Tushnet, supra note 17, at 700 (suggesting “a candid assessment of the
plaintiff ’s ability to present the case adequately and a pragmatic evaluation of the factual
concreteness that could be expected ... with a reluctance to find standing where plaintiffs more
directly affected by the claimed illegality might realistically be expected to come forward ...
[and] a revitalized political question doctrine, which would allow the court to confront directly
the separation-of-powers concerns” that arise under the guise of standing decisions).
327. Elliott, Functions, supra note 17, at 514.
328. Id. at 464.
329. See, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2098 (2019) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring in the judgment); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1941 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (Alito, J.);
Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016) (Breyer, J.); Camreta v. Greene, 563
U.S. 692, 701 (2011) (Kagan, J.); DaimlerChrysler Corp. C. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341-42
(2006) (Roberts, C.J.); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (Ginsburg, J.); see also In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 759-60
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.); Lamar Advert. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356
F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, J.).
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B. Congress Would Do It Better but Will Not
Congress is far better placed than the courts to make complicated
factual distinctions among organizations, which might be based on
the size of organizations and the nature of the organization’s pur-
pose330 (though the First Amendment constrains the latter).331 But
Congress seems unlikely to do so.
1. Congress’s Authority to Act
As noted above, Congress cannot alter by statute the fundamental
standing requirements the Court has imposed through Article III.332
Congress may create legal causes of action for those who have suf-
fered injury in fact as defined by the Court333 but cannot expand
standing beyond Article III boundaries.334 Thus, when Congress
enacts a statute that permits “any citizen” (or, conceivably, any
membership organization) to sue—statutory language that certainly
looks like a congressional effort to authorize pure private attorneys
general—the Court has said that the “any citizen” language merely
reflects Congress’s intent to authorize suits as broadly as Article III
permits.335
The Court has emphasized that Congress may not change the
constitutional rules that the Court itself has established.336 In City
of Boerne v. Flores, the Court rejected a congressional effort to
overrule First Amendment precedent because to permit Congress’s
action would “contradict[ ] vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers.”337 I have therefore argued that the Court is
likely to reject any congressional effort to rewrite the rules of
330. KOMESAR, supra note 25, at 141.
331. See infra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
332. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); supra notes 79-81 and ac-
companying text; see also Elliott, Inability, supra note 17, at 190-91 (arguing that Boerne
would stand in the way of congressional efforts to find standing by statute). But see Seidenfeld
& Akre, supra note 17, at 751-52 (arguing that Congress’s power to find facts gives it more
authority to define injury in fact and causation than has been recognized).
333. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). 
334. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547-48 (2016) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 818 (1997)).
335. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1997).
336. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
337. Id. at 536.
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standing.338 Because it would essentially overturn fifty years of
standing doctrine if Congress were to abolish the ban on pure
private attorneys general or lift all restrictions on organizational
standing, Congress can take neither step.
But, as Professor Mark Seidenfeld has argued, Congress can find
legislative facts that convince courts to recognize injury in fact, cau-
sation, and redress.339 Congress could therefore find facts that relate
to the suitability of membership associations to proceed in federal
court under the existing Hunt standards, and courts could take note
of those facts in deciding on associational standing. What is more,
Congress has wide authority to regulate the federal courts.340 Thus,
it is within Congress’s constitutional authority to resolve incongru-
ities in access to the federal courts.
At the same time, Congress is limited in how it can regulate in
this area by the First Amendment rights of free speech, assembly,
and petition.341 For example, Congress could not bar associational
standing. As a matter of politics, legislators would not act to deprive
the thousands of American associations of their access to the courts.
What’s more, Congress is likely forbidden from doing so by the First
Amendment.342
338. Elliott, Inability, supra note 17, at 165, 167, 225.
339. Seidenfeld & Akre, supra note 17, at 748.
340. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.” (emphasis added)); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned,
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” (emphasis added)).
341. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K: The “Difficult Constitutional Question”
of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1299, 1300-02,
1307-08 (2003); Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 560, 688-89 (1999); cf. Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 216-19 (1985); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority
to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 508 (1974); Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953).
342. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 934 (1963) (“The concept of freedom of expression presently extends to a right
of association, that is, a right to form and join organizations for the advancement of particular
views and to carry on all the normal activities of such associations.”).
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More limited restraints on associational standing may also run
afoul of the First Amendment. To the extent that such restraints
look like content-based restrictions on speech, they would be subject
to strict scrutiny.343 But if akin to time, place, and manner restric-
tions in the free speech context, rather than content-based restric-
tions,344 Congress’s modifications of associational standing rules
would be acceptable.
Congress might also itself recognize the constitutional problem
such regulations would raise and frame any statute on association-
al standing accordingly. Therefore, Congress could create presump-
tive standing for organizations that meet certain standards, while
leaving open the possibility that courts could override the limita-
tions where they find a constitutional infirmity. In this way, Con-
gress would incorporate a constitutional avoidance principle into
the statute itself.345
2. Congress Has Many Options
So long as Congress stays within the boundaries of existing
standing doctrine and the First Amendment, it has a number of op-
tions for regulating court access in a way that helps resolve the
tension between Sierra Club and Hunt. Congress is well-placed to
consider systemic issues in access to and burdens on the courts, con-
fer causes of action on appropriate plaintiffs, adjust associational
343. Regulations of speech that laws have the effect of discriminating among differing
viewpoints are generally unconstitutional. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533, 536-37, 548-49 (2001) (holding that Legal Services Corporation funding cannot be
contingent on attorneys agreeing not to make certain argument on behalf of their clients);
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 812, 815 (2000) (holding that the Federal
Telecommunications Act, in limiting the circumstances under which cable-television channels
could broadcast sexually explicit material, was a content-based restriction on speech and was
therefore subject to strict scrutiny; further holding that the federal government had not shown
that the statute employed the least restrictive means to prevent children from seeing sexually
explicit material).
344. Under the “time, place, and manner” doctrine, the Court permits narrowly tailored
regulations that, without viewpoint discrimination, regulate the circumstances of the speech.
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (finding the regulation of noise
levels at public performances constitutional).
345. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (“[A]n Act of Congress
ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains
available.”).
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standing to reflect concerns about federalism and separation of
powers, and the like.
First, Congress might conclude that municipalities pose an es-
pecially problematic instance of the Sierra Club-Hunt conflict, and
it thus could make clear that municipalities are not proper associa-
tions under Hunt. In doing so, Congress would be doing little more
than what it already does when it writes statutes and defines who
can be proper parties to lawsuits.346 Moreover, because municipali-
ties have no inherent sovereignty, they would appear to have little
ability to object to such exclusion. However, as already noted, pre-
venting municipal use of Hunt does not resolve the problem posed
under Sierra Club by organizations that are very large and/or have
very broad purposes.
Congress might instead decide that cities (and states)347 are the
most trustworthy entities to serve as private attorneys general.
While Hunt requires organizations to be membership organi-
zations,348 many membership organizations have little actual control
from their members.349 Those who act for cities, by contrast, are
subject to regular elections.350 In addition, associations can have
members anywhere and can readily obtain new members. Cities, on
the other hand, have geographical limits and gain new members
with some difficulty. One cannot simply sign up online to be a
346. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694-95 (1978).
347. States can sue in parens patriae, see supra note 246 and accompanying text, and are
also given “special solicitude” under Article III, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520
(2007), so I have not spent time discussing states as litigants using Hunt. However, it has
been suggested that states should have the same ease of suit as organizations. See Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 611 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“At the very least, the prerogative of a State to bring suits in federal court should
be commensurate with the ability of private organizations.”); see also Crocker, supra note 16,
at 2066-67.
348. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
349. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES: CLASSICAL
FOUNDATIONS 177 (Paul S. Adler ed., 2009) (compiling sociological research on how orga-
nizations are controlled by a small subset of members).
350. Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
851, 897 (2016) (noting that “state attorneys general have strong political incentives to
respond to the preferences of state constituents,” which may result in “a better job of rep-
resenting the State in court”); Lemos & Young, supra note 264, at 113-14 (“[A] state [attorney
general] should be more accountable to a state’s citizens than the leaders of an organization
like the Sierra Club.”).
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citizen of New York City; one must move to New York City, prove
residency, and so forth.
Cities also face considerable resource constraints.351 City officials
must choose where to spend their resources and may often choose
not to spend them on litigation.352 While associations also face
resource constraints, many of them have devoted significant re-
sources to litigation.353 The threshold for a city-filed lawsuit may
therefore be higher than the threshold for an association-filed
lawsuit.
To the extent we are worried about a roving commission to en-
force the law, cities may have more inherent limits than member-
ship associations and therefore be less troubling attorneys general.
As a result, Congress could encourage standing for municipalities
by finding facts and making causal connections that show how mu-
nicipalities satisfy Article III—factfinding to which the Court should
then give some deference.
Congress could also set guidelines that address the size of orga-
nizations, either directly or indirectly and can consider a wide
variety of factors in doing so. Direct caps on size are possible though
unlikely: it is difficult to imagine the evidence upon which Congress
might limit associational standing simply because an organization
had x members, rather than x-1 members. One can envision a
sliding scale where the bigger the organization, the more it would
be required show along other axes, such as its demonstrated
expertise in a particular area. There are also sensible policies
Congress could adopt that go indirectly to size, such as giving
preference to associations that could show meaningful membership
involvement in the genesis of the lawsuit.354 Similarly, Congress
351. E.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L. J. 1118, 1120-22
(2014).
352. See id.
353. E.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 2027, 2029 (2008).
354. See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1673-74 (1997)
(suggesting that organizations should be required to prove notice to members regarding
litigation or that attorney ethics rules be amended to encourage lawyers representing
associations to engage in more democratic practices with respect to association members); cf.,
e.g., Steen & Hopkins, supra note 112, at 252-53 (arguing that associations should have
standing under Hunt only if the membership exercises control over the association’s board of
directors). But see Karl S. Coplan, Is Voting Necessary? Organization Standing and Non-
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could establish factors that help make the germaneness prong more
useful as a limit on pure private attorneys general, rather than the
vague rule it serves as today.355
One amendment Congress could probably not make to Hunt is
to insist that membership in associations be voluntary. Congress
might wish to do this to bring associational standing more in line
with our intuitions about associational standing. But Hunt itself
involved involuntary membership so such a move by Congress is
arguably an attempt to overturn precedent, something that City of
Boerne forbids.356 It would mean no standing for many unions, bar
associations, and other organizations whose membership is not
strictly voluntary yet whose standing has been recognized by the
Supreme Court.357
Congress also would tread on dangerous ground if it tried to lim-
it the purposes of organizations who were entitled to sue. Assume,
for example, that Congress tried to limit associational standing to
those groups that had relatively focused purposes. The very choice
between a broad and a narrow agenda would seem to be part of the
agenda of the organization rather than a simple time, place, or
manner restriction. And the agenda of the organization is presum-
ably protected by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise, Freedom of
Association, or Petition Clauses.358
For example, it would likely be impermissible for Congress to
limit court access for the Organization of Americans for the Rule of
Law by saying that its members have chosen too broad a purpose in
banding together.359 Such a limit could be seen as a content re-
striction under the Free Exercise Clause: Congress is stating a pref-
erence for narrow messages over broad messages. It could also be
seen as an impermissible limit on citizens’ freedom to associate: you
are not allowed to band together in this way. Finally, it could be
seen as an impermissible infringement on the freedom to petition,
Voting Members of Environmental Advocacy Organizations, 14 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47,
82 (2005) (noting that mandating full voting rights for the membership may put an orga-
nization at risk of a hostile takeover).
355. See supra Part 1.C.2.c.ii.
356. See supra notes 336-38 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986).
358. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Adminis-
trative Lawmaking, Standing, and the Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 377, 380-81 (2009).
359. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
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by telling groups with broad purposes that they cannot access the
courts.
3. Congress Is Unlikely to Act
Whatever the options that Congress has for resolving the Hunt-
Sierra Club conflict, and however more appropriate an institution
such as Congress may be for resolving it, it seems highly unlikely
that Congress would actually take any steps to do so. Not only
has Congress been notably dysfunctional for years,360 but it also
faces innumerable problems more important than the one I de-
scribe here.361 It is virtually impossible to imagine Congress paying
attention to the conflict between Hunt and Sierra Club.
C. Judicial Fixes for Hunt
Standing doctrine is not going anywhere.362 And Congress, while
institutionally suited to solving the problem, is extremely unlikely
to do so.363 One option, then, is to ignore the conflict I have de-
scribed. After all, as I have admitted, no organization or municipal-
ity is a pure private attorney general, because even AARP364 and
New York City365 cannot bring literally any lawsuit. Instead, Hunt
permits nearly pure private attorneys general,366 and that may be
short enough of a true conflict to say that the doctrine need not be
fixed.
360. See generally, e.g., CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 11th ed. 2017); DAVIS ET AL., supra note 24; ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF
CONGRESS: HOW AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION WORKS, AND HOW IT DOESN’T (2013).
361. For example, the evisceration of voting rights caused by the Court’s decision in Shelby
County v. Holder is certainly more important, yet Congress has not yet amended the Voting
Rights Act. 570 U.S. 529, 556-57 (2013); see Mary C. Curtis, Voting Rights, a Partisan Issue?
Yes, Republicans Have Fallen that Far, ROLL CALL (Dec. 16, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.roll
call.com/news/opinion/voting-rights-partisan-issue-yes-one-party-fallen-far [https://perma.cc/
RNB3-CTCT] (describing bill introduced in the House of Representatives in late 2019 to
“shore up sections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 tossed out by the Supreme Court in ...
Shelby County”).
362. See supra Part III.A.
363. See supra Part III.B.
364. See supra notes 182-96 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
366. See supra Part II.B.3.
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But given the Court’s separation-of-powers rhetoric367 and the
emphasis it has placed on a strict doctrine of standing,368 it would be
odd to take that approach. And doctrinal conflicts should not be ig-
nored: it violates our ideas of the rule of law that courts would
simultaneously prohibit and allow an action.369
If the Court were to act, what options does it have? First, the
Court could abandon associational standing altogether. But or-
ganizations across the political spectrum and in every facet of life
bring lawsuit to vindicate important interests,370 and even Justice
Scalia recognized the benefits of associations as litigators.371 Indeed,
a recent article urging strict adherence to the standing doctrine and
accusing the Court of ultra vires actions did not advocate abolishing
associational standing.372 Given the valuable role that organizations
play in upholding the public interest, it seems unlikely—and is
certainly undesirable—that the Court would overrule Hunt.
Moreover, abolishing Hunt would likely be a mere formality. As
a practical matter, many lawsuits brought by individuals in the
367. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
368. See supra Part I.A.1.
369. Cf., e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional
Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1337 (2001) (“[I]t seems difficult to conceive of the rule
of law in a setting in which citizens may be unable to discovery ex ante the consequences of
their acts.”).
370. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 1041, 1041 (2010);
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th
Cir. 2018).
371. Scalia, supra note 103, at 891 (“Often the very best adversaries are national
organizations such as the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen
interest in the abstract question at issue in the case, but no concrete injury in fact whatever.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
372. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481, 484,
538 (2018) (arguing for the abolition of the current rule—of-so called “supplemental plaintiff
standing”—where one plaintiff has standing, then there need be no inquiry into the standing
of other plaintiffs who make the same claim and seek the same remedy but noting that
“[t]here is at least one aspect of current standing law that does fit comfortably with the one-
plaintiff rule, and that is the doctrine of associational standing.... Associational standing has
a superficial resemblance to supplemental-plaintiff standing in that one entity’s standing is
sufficient to confer standing on another, but the theory behind the two doctrines is quite
different. Associational standing is a form of representational standing in which the
association stands in the shoes of its affected members. In the usual multiple-plaintiff case
in which the one-plaintiff rule is applied, the parties who obtain the benefit of the rule do not
stand in any such representational relationship; they merely have the same legal claim as the
other plaintiffs. The doctrine of associational standing therefore stands even if the one-
plaintiff rule fails.” (footnotes omitted)).
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wake of a Hunt abolition would in reality be pursued by the as-
sociations.373 Associations, instead of tendering affidavits from their
members in support of a Hunt analysis, would instead recruit
members to serve as plaintiffs, much as class action attorneys do
now.374
Second, the Supreme Court could fix Hunt to avoid its conflict
with Sierra Club. Having courts answer questions such as “how big
is too big” and “how broad a purpose is too broad?” raises some
concerns regarding the courts’ institutional capability.375 But courts
are involved in evaluating organizational purposes in other con-
texts,376 and it might be possible for the Court to give the ger-
maneness prong more teeth.
More formalistic distinctions are fairly easy for courts to make:
the Court could state, as some courts already have, that cities are
simply not associations.377 While this does not address the problem
posed by large, nonmunicipal organizations and smaller organiza-
tions with broad purposes,378 it does ameliorate the tension between
Hunt and Sierra Club.
Third, the Court could add factors to Hunt that limit its reach.
One might be to require more demonstrated expertise from associa-
tions. In dissent in Sierra Club, Justice Blackmun suggested focus-
ing on the Sierra Club’s “pertinent, bona fide, and well-recognized
attributes and purposes in the area of environment.”379 While the
Court long ago rejected the idea of permitting associational standing
based on expertise, nothing prevents the Court from adding such a
373. Nonmembership organizations already take this approach. See, e.g., ‘Regular’ Guy
Takes Aim at the Law, WASH. TIMES (July 27, 2008), https://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2008/jul/27/regular-guy-takes-aim-at-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/H9SJ-FUQT] (describ-
ing how the Cato Institute identified and represented Richard Anthony Heller in litigation
under Second Amendment).
374. See, e.g., Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for
Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 59-60 (2002).
375. See KOMESAR, supra note 25, at 141.
376. E.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-56 (2000) (evaluating whether Boy
Scouts could, within its First Amendment expressive rights, prohibit gay scoutmasters).
377. See, e.g., City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 267-68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The
City does not have ‘members’ who have voluntarily associated, nor are the interests it seeks
to assert here germane to its purpose.”).
378. See supra Part II.A.
379. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 757 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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requirement as courts are already involved in evaluating
expertise.380
The Court could also add pleading requirements that require
more of organizations before they can invoke Hunt, such as a vote
from the membership to authorize the lawsuit.381 As noted earlier,
courts define “membership organizations” in part by the control that
the membership exerts over the organization’s leadership,382 so it is
not a huge step to require that control to be asserted over the
lawsuits an organization hopes to pursue.
CONCLUSION
Article III doctrine has long been troubled, and at least part of the
problem is its imposition on the courts of many questions that
courts are institutionally unsuited to answer. A previously unno-
ticed conflict in the doctrine—between Sierra Club’s ban on pure
private attorneys general, and Hunt’s generous authorization of
associational standing—highlights both the lamentable state of
Article III doctrine and the difficulty courts have in fixing it.
Although the conflict between Sierra Club and Hunt may seem
somewhat abstract, the recent arguments for applying Hunt as-
sociational standing to municipalities shows that, given the in-
creasing involvement of cities in impact litigation, the problem is far
from merely theoretical. And there are reasons to celebrate the in-
volvement of cities and states in public-interest litigation: they are
generally more democratically accountable than membership or-
ganizations, and they are perhaps more likely to be selective about
the lawsuits they bring, giving gravitas to the claims that they
make.
Congress is institutionally well-suited to making the kind of com-
plex decisions that are necessary to resolve this doctrinal tension.
But Congress is, at least at the moment, unlikely to devote its in-
stitutional time to solving this problem. The least-worst option
380. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
381. Steen & Hopkins, supra note 112, at 257 (nonprofit corporation, to invoke Hunt,
should have “to plead and prove the controlling franchise of the members it seeks to
represent”). But see Rubenstein, supra note 354, at 1657 (noting difficulties in requiring such
voting).
382. See supra note 131.
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seems to be for courts to tinker at the margins of Hunt and Sierra
Club to lessen the consequences of this doctrinal conflict.
